Nebraska Supreme Court Review by Beltzer, James A. et al.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 48 | Issue 4 Article 7
1969
Nebraska Supreme Court Review
James A. Beltzer
University of Nebraska College of Law
Roger M. Beverage
University of Nebraska College of Law, roger@oba.com
Thomas R. Pansing
University of Nebraska College of Law, tpansing@pheblaw.com
John A. Rasmussen Jr.
University of Nebraska College of Law, christie@arvigo.net
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
James A. Beltzer, Roger M. Beverage, Thomas R. Pansing, and John A. Rasmussen Jr., Nebraska Supreme Court Review, 48 Neb. L. Rev.
985 (1969)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol48/iss4/7
NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Nebraska Law Review is pleased to introduce in this issue a
section devoted exclusively to recent decisions of the Nebraska
Supreme Court. This section, to be published on an annual basis,
will contain a critical discussion of recent decisions which the
Nebraska Law Review believes are either cases of first impression
in our court or rulings which substantially alter previous case law
in Nebraska. The purpose of the Nebraska section is (1) to provide
attorneys in Nebraska and elsewhere with a comprehensive study
of the holdings of selected cases and an analysis of how these
decisions relate to previous Nebraska decisions, and (2) to provide
a forum in which members of the Nebraska Law Review can
critically analyze the rationale of the cases in light of decisions in
other jurisdictions.
The decisions composing this first annual Nebraska section were
taken from decisions handed down during the calendar year 1968.
A large number of those selected are in the criminal law area
because of the many constitutional issues raised by the United
States Supreme Court's decisions applying constitutional amend-
ments to the states.
The subject areas and decisions discussed in this first Nebraska
Supreme Court Review are as follows:
I. Administrative Law
A. Poulson v. Hargleroad Van & Storage, 183 Neb. 201, 159
N.W.2d 302 (1968).
II. Attorneys
A. State v. Richards, 183 Neb. 184, 159 N.W.2d 317 (1968).
III. Civil Procedure
A. Beveridge v. State, 183 Neb. 406, 160 N.W. 2d 299 (1968).
B. Berigan Bros. v. Growers Cattle Credit Corp., 182 Neb.
656, 156 N.W.2d 794 (1968).
C. Benes v. Matulka, 182 Neb. 744, 157 N.W.2d 832 (1968).
IV. Criminal Law
A. Constitutional Protection
1. State v. Montgomery, 182 Neb. 737, 157 N.W.2d 196
(1968).
2. State v. Godfrey, 182 Neb. 451, 155 N.W.2d 438
(1968).
3. State v. Reizenstein, 183 Neb. 376, 160 N.W.2d 208
(1968).
4. State v. Oliva, 183 Neb. 620, 163 N.W.2d 112 (1968).
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5. State v. Simants, 183 Neb. 491, 155 N.W.2d 788
(1968).
6. State v. Forney, 182 Neb. 802, 157 N.W. 2d 403 (1968).
7. State v. Heizer, 183 Neb. 665, 163 N.W. 2d 582 (1968).
B. Procedure
1. State v. Tunender, 182 Neb. 701, 157 N.W.2d 165
(1968).
C. Juveniles
1. DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508
(1968).
2. Guy v. Doeschot, 183 Neb. 557, 162 N.W.2d 524 (1968).
V. Damages
A. Hughes Farm, Inc. v. Tri-State Gen. & Trans. Ass'n., 182
Neb. 791, 157 N.W.2d 384 (1968).
VI. Evidence
A. Metropolitan Protection Service v. Tanner, 182 Neb. 507,
155 N.W.2d 803 (1968).
VII. Initiative Petition Procedure
A. State ex rel. Morris v. Marsh, 183 Neb. 502, 162 N.W.2d
262 (1968).
VIII. Municipal Corporations
A. Dock v. City of Imperial, 182 Neb. 526, 155 N.W.2d 924
(1968).
IX. State Constitutional Law
A. Tom & Jerry, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commis-
sion, 183 Neb. 410, 160 N.W.2d 232 (1968).
B. State ex rel. Norton v. Janing, 182 Neb. 539, 156 N.W.2d
9 (1968).
X. Tort-Governmental Immunity
A. Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805
(1968).
XI. Torts-Gross Negligence
A. Brugh v. Peterson, 183 Neb. 190, 159 N.W.2d 321 (1968).
XII. Traffic Administration
A. Ziemba v. Johns, 183 Neb. 644, 163 N.W.2d 780 (1968).
XIII. Wills-Statutory Exemption in Lieu of Homestead
A. Estate of Grassman, 183 Neb. 147, 158 N.W.2d 673 (1968).
The Nebraska section does not include those cases which are or
may become the subject of individual case notes. Thus this section
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does not represent a discussion of all of the important Nebraska
decisions. The Nebraska Law Review would welcome any sug-
gestions from Nebraska attorneys or others interested in Nebraska
law regarding both the method by which cases may be selected for
future Nebraska Sections and the general form and content of this
new venture.
James A. Beltzer '69
Student Articles Editor
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Poulson v. Hargleroad Van & Storage Co1 altered the law in
Nebraska by redefining upon what grounds and to what extent the
Nebraska Supreme Court will feel entitled to review decisions of
the Nebraska Railway Commission.
Poulson involved an appeal by 0. E. Poulson, Inc. from an order
of the Nebraska State Railway Commission denying an application
for a certificate of public convenience and necessity.2 Appellant,
along with eight other carriers, had filed application requesting
authority to transport anhydrous ammonia in Nebraska. Appellant's
application was refused while the other eight were approved. One
of the other applicants, prior to the Railway Commission hearing,
had held authority to transport fertilizers and anhydrous ammonia
between all points in Nebraska. The seven other successful appli-
cants had authority to transport petroleum products, but such
authority was limited to providing service within particular geo-
graphic areas within the state. Poulson did not have authority to
transport either petroleum products or fertilizers. All applicants
sought permission to transport anhydrous ammonia and each re-
quested authority to transport the fertilizer throughout the state.
At the conclusion of the hearing, all the applicants except Poulson
were granted authority to transport anhydrous ammonia on a state-
wide basis. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the denial of
Poulson's certificate of public convenience and necessity by the
Nebraska Railway Commission was arbitrary and unreasonable
and, therefore, reversed the Commission's denial of the certificate.
The court stated that the only question which it could decide on
appeal from a decision of the Commission was whether the Com-
mission acted within the scope of its authority and whether the
order complained of was reasonably and not arbitrarily made.3
1 183 Neb. 201, 159 N.W.2d 302 (1968).
2 Right to transport goods in Nebraska.
3 This is the only question that the Supreme Court of Nebraska can
hear on appeal because the Nebraska Constitution has given the Com-
mission plenary and absolute power over common carriers except
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The governing Nebraska statute4 requires a certificate to be
issued by the Commission, after notice and a formal hearing, if the
applicant is fit, willing, and able to properly perform the proposed
service and to conform to the provisions of certain other statutes
which are consistent with the public interest. The court in deciding
Poulson looked to prior case law in determining the issue of public
necessity.
In cases where new or extended operating rights are sought, the
controlling questions are whether the operation will serve a useful
purpose responsive to a public demand or need and whether this
purpose can or will be served by applicant in a specified opera-
tion without endangering or impairing the operations of existing
carriers contrary to public interest.5
The court reasoned that Poulson was ready and willing to be a
carrier of anhydrous ammonia, that there was sufficient demand for
another carrier, and that allowing Poulson to be a carrier would not
destroy the already existing legitimate competition. Therefore the
Commission's denial of Poulson's certificate was held to be arbi-
trary and unreasonable.
This case is particularly important because the Nebraska Su-
preme Court, under the cloak of finding "arbitrariness," has in
effect assumed, at least to some degree, the administrative func-
tions which are vested solely with the Commission. The Court's
function is not to judge evidence presented to the Commission; this
task rests solely with the Commission. Rather the proper role of
judicial review is to determine whether the Commission employed
the required procedures in arriving at its decision-formal hearings,
notice of hearings to all parties, presentment of all relevant evi-
dence-in order to insure a non-arbitrary result. The findings of
the Commission are to be viewed as the findings of a jury6 and
unless those findings could not be based upon or related to the
evidence presented, the court has no power "or should" have no
power to reverse a decision of the Commission.
A review of the evidence in Poulson which was presented at the
formal hearing clearly shows that the court surpassed its constitu-
tional powers and has become involved in making the administra-
tive determinations for which the Commission was established and
to the extent that the legislature has occupied the field or limited the
power of the Commission by statute. The Nebraska Constitution does
not give th ecourts this power. NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 20.
SNEB. REV. STAT. § 75-311 (Reissue 1966).
5 Petroleum Transp. Co. v. All Class I Rail Carriers, 173 Neb. 564, 114
N.W.2d 34 (1962).
6 In re Curtailment of Bus Service, 125 Neb. 825, 252 N.W. 407 (1934).
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is uniquely qualified. Poulson is the only one of the nine applicants
that had no Railway Commission authority to transport fertilizer,
including anhydrous ammonia, and was the only applicant who had
not transported these commodities in intrastate commerce. Poulson
owned only one tractor and trailer suitable for the transportation of
anhydrous ammonia while the other applicants had available over
200 units of equipment suitable for this type of operation. All of
the witnesses at the hearing supported the other eight applications,
but two of these witnesses, including one of the largest shippers of
fertilizers in the state, did not support the Poulson application.
Herman Brothers protested the application of Poulson on the
grounds that they had a large investment in expensive truck
equipment which was not being fully utilized. By virtue of its
existing certificate, this larger competitor could transport anhydrous
ammonia between all points in Nebraska. There had been no time
during the past fertilizer season or in the company's experience
when Herman Brothers had an equipment utilization of greater
than 250 hours in one month per unit. Normally, in an efficient
truck operation each unit is utilized 400 hours per month. Thus
Herman Brothers wanted their equipment more fully utilized
before new competition was allowed to enter the field.
Comparing the evidence submitted at the hearing with prior
Nebraska case law, it can readily be seen that the Commission acted
well within its constitutional and statutory authority in denying
Poulson a certificate of public necessity and convenience. In Appli-
cation of West Nebraska Express,7 the Supreme Court of Nebraska
held that when an order is made by the State Railway Commission,
in the exercise of its administrative and legislative authority, and
is presented to the Supreme Court for review, the function of the
court is to determine if there is proof to support the order. The
evidence given at the Poulson hearing was obviously sufficient to
support the Commission's decision. The decision in Application of
Hagen Truck Lines,8 established that an applicant for contract car-
rier authority had the burden to show to the Commission that the
proposed service was specialized and fitted the need of the proposed
contracting shippers. Under this test, Poulson certainly did not
appear to be sufficiently specialized or fitted to the particular need
to carry that material. Furthermore, Hagen held that if the prior
7 159 Neb. 353, 67 N.W.2d 342 (1952). See also Application of McKeone,
159 Neb. 488, 67 N.W.2d 475 (1955); Chicago, B&Q Co. v. Keifer, 160
Neb. 168, 69 N.W.2d 541 (1955).
8 Application of Hagen Truck Lines, Inc., 174 Neb. 646, 119 N.W.2d
76 (1963).
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contract carriers showed that they were fit, willing, and able to
meet the special need, then the applicant for contract carrier
authority, even if he was specialized for the task, must show that
he is better equipped and qualified to meet the special needs than
are the carriers already performing the service. Poulson was not
only not specialized for the task, but his equipment was markedly
inferior. Finally, Hagen stated that where evidence is in conflict
as between an applicant for a contract-carrier permit and objecting
common carriers, it is the province of the Railway Commission to
resolve the issue.
The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Poulson indicates
that it has now assumed the position of a "super review board"
both willing and able to exercise a wholly administrative discretion
over the Railway Commission. If this is correct, the court has
assumed power, not given it by either the state constitution or the
state statutes, and for the exercise of which it lacks the necessary
competence The court has no investigating body, nor the "ex-
pertise to make ... (administrative) decisions."'10
II. ATTORNEYS
Two decisions directly affecting the duty of an attorney to his
client were handed down by the Nebraska Supreme Court in 1968.
The first, State v. Tunender," involved a post conviction proceeding
motion alleging that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance.
The Court reversed the defendant's conviction because it found a
breach of the duty of loyalty owed by the attorney. This case is
discussed in the Criminal Law section of this note, infra.
9 The dissenting opinion in Poulson points out that the majority cites
no case from any court where the Railway Commission's or Utility
Commission's certificate was reversed on similar grounds. There are
many cases from other jurisdictions which hold that the determina-
tion or the right to a certificate is for the commission alone to deter-
mine and the court is bound by the commission's decision on the
question. See Price v. Public Utilities Commission, 72 Colo. 65, 209
P. 640 (1922), which held that a denial of a certificate in the public
interest is a purely administrative function from which an unsuc-
cessful applicant cannot appeal. See also Modeste v. Public Utilities
Commission, 97 Conn. 453, 117 A. 494 (1922); In re Samoset Co. 125
Me. 141, 131 A. 692 (1926); Sparata Foundry Co. v. Michigan Public
Utilities Commission, 275 Mich. 562, 267 N.W. 736 (1936); Tri-State
Transit Co. of La. v. Mobile & Ohio Transp. Co., 191 Miss. 364, 2 So.
2d 845 (1928).
10 Poulson v. Hargleroad Van & Storage Co., 183 Neb. 201, 212, 159
N.W.2d 302, 308 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
11 182 Neb. 701, 157 N.W.2d 165 (1968).
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In State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Richards,12 two
Nebraska attorneys were suspended from practicing law for one
year because of violation of Canon 38.13 The suspension resulted
from a number of transactions in which the attorneys accepted
payment of 50% of auctioneer's fees paid to two auctioneers whom
the attorneys had hired or suggested for auctioning property for
estates or other clients. Neither attorney disclosed the payment to
either the court or their client though in at least three instances the
trial court subsequently awarded attorney's fees.
Three defenses were raised: first, that the rebates had caused
no harm to the clients; second, that the fees had been earned by
the attorneys; and third, that the referee had failed to find the
requisite wrongful intent. The court held that: (1) though the
rebate may not have increased the cost to the clients, the "[a]ntici-
pation of a rebate from a company may tempt the lawyer to recom-
mend that company to his client"'14 and this temptation places the
lawyer in a position of divided loyalty; (2) when seeking a fee
from the court, the attorney is under a duty of complete disclosure
and the attorney cannot conceal the benefits he gains from the
work on an estate, have attorney's fees allowed on that basis, and
later contend that the fees were earned; and (3) information with-
held in violation of the duty of disclosure which raised a conflict
between personal interest and professional duty is sufficient to
show the requisite wrongful intent by circumstantial evidence.
The Supreme Court has now brought the generally accepted
interpretations of Canon 38 and the attorney's duties thereunder to
bear on the Nebraska Bar. Primarily this is a duty of disclosure,
but included by implication is the duty of loyalty to the client.15
Full disclosure and consent by the client will not, however, in all
cases leave an attorney free to accept payment from other than his
client where such a payment is "too obviously capable of mis-
construction."'16 An attorney may never, for instance, accept a
payment from the opposing party after the close of litigation.17
12 183 Neb. 184, 159 N.W.2d 317 (1968).
13 ABA CANONS. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmcs No. 38 reads: A lawyer should
accept no compensation, commission, rebates or other advantages from
others without the knowledge and consent of his client after full
disclosure.
14 State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Richards, 183 Neb. 184, 188,
159 N.W.2d 317, 319 (1968).
15 H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETmIcs 97 (1953).
16 Id. at 97-98: "Even with the clients consent he [the lawyer] should
not accept a gift from the opposite party in appreciation of 'kindness,
gentleness and indulgence' after the close of litigation, this being too
obviously capable of misconstruction."
17 Id. See ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, INFomAL OPINION No.
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When the matter of attorney's fees is before the court the attor-
ney has a duty beyond disclosure to his client, he must fully inform
the court in all matters pertaining to fees, including any benefits to
be received after the close of the litigation. The court in Richard-
son cited Wise in Legal Ethics (1966) which states:
When a lawyer seeks a fee from the court in a matter in which
the court has an interest.., the attorney must make a complete
disclosure of all circumstances. He must disclose the nature and
content of agreements for fees, if any, whether or not he received
or will receive compensation or other direct or indirect benefits
of any kind from the clients or others, and any other fact which
would have a bearing on the propriety of the compensation he
seeks.' 8
Three formal opinions have been handed down by the American
Bar Association on this problem. These opinions illustrate that only
after complete disclosure and consent by the client may an attor-
ney accept compensation from another party; i.e., a commission
from the sale of title insurance,19 one-fourth of a fee charged by the
maker of an abstract,20 or repayment of an expense for a railroad
fare not actually incurred because the attorney had a free pass from
the railroad.21
In Informal Opinion No. 68022 the American Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics found it was a violation of Canon
38 for an attorney to "accept a referral fee for recommending the
placement of his client's funds in a particular savings and loan
association unless his client knows and approves of such an arrange-
ment."
The American Bar Association Committee on Evaluation of
Professional Ethics has proposed a rule specifically disallowing any
278, "A lawyer may not accept a gratuity from anyone without his
client's knowledge and consent, and if he does so the gratuity really
belongs to the client who, of course, may make the attorney fee more
generous by reason of it but is not bound to do so."
18 R. WISE, LEGAL ETmcs 122 (1966). See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETIcs
98 (1953): "He (the attorney) may not suggest to the client an
extra fee in cases assigned to him by the court or in absence of such
a suggestion, accept such fee except on order by the court."
19 ABA Commn. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, OPINIONS, No. 304 (1962).
20 ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHcs, OPINIONS, No. 196 (1939).
21 ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 38 (1931).
22 ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, INFORMAL OPINION No. 680.
See id. at No. 556 (a lawyer may not engage in the sale of life insur-
ance and accept a portion of a commission); id. at No. 526 (a lawyer
may not accept a fee for investing his client's funds in a lay organi-
zation); id. at No. 278. See note 6 supra.
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compensation from other than the client without disclosure and
consent.23 In its discussion on this point the Committee stated:
Economic, political or social pressures by third persons are less
likely to impinge upon the individual judgment of a lawyer in a
matter in which he is compensated directly by his client and his
professional work is exclusively with the client. On the other hand,
if a lawyer is compensated from a source other than his client he
may feel a sense of responsibility to someone other than his client.24
The Supreme Court has adopted this standard for the Nebraska
Bar by its decision in the Richardson case, and, more specifically,
by refusing to accept the referee's failure to show actual harm as
a defense. Further violations in this area will be treated as willful
and with wrongful intent after this decision which not only gives
notice that such actions are in violation of Canon 38, but finds the
wrongful intent through circumstantial evidence.
III. CIVIL PROCEDURE
Three recent decisions must be considered as having a signifi-
cant impact upon civil procedure in Nebraska. The first, Beveridge
v. State,25 considered the difficult question of an attorney's duty to
object to proposed jury instructions in the trial court when the trial
judge submits such proposed instructions to the attorneys a rea-
sonable time before delivering them to the jury.
Berigan Bros. v. Growers Cattle Credit Corp.26 was an action
for declaratory judgment on a number of issues, some of which
had been raised by a prior action but had not yet been litigated.
The Supreme Court allowed the action for declaratory judgment to
supersede the prior action.
Finally, Benes v. Matulka2 7 involved the question of whether a
motion to strike a counterclaim, sustained in the trial court, was a
"final order" from which an appeal may be taken prior to a
determination on the original complaint.
23 ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE Ox EVALUATION OF ETHcAL STANnA1ms,
CoDE OF PRorEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 69 (1969):
6-108 Avoiding Influence by Other Than the Client
(A) Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure a
lawyer shall not:
(1) Accept compensation for legal services from other than
his client.
(2) Accept from one other than his client anything of value
relating to his representation of or his employment by
his client.
24 Id. at 65.
25 183 Neb. 406, 160 N.W.2d 229 (1968).
26 182 Neb. 656, 156 N.W.2d 794 (1968).
27 182 Neb. 744, 157 N.W.2d 832 (1968).
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A. BEVr MGE V. STATE28
An attorney who states specifically that he has no objections to
jury instructions proposed by the trial judge, after he has had an
adequate opportunity for examination of such instructions, cannot
appeal an adverse decision by the jury on the basis of errors in
such instructions.
In Beveridge v. State2 the judge submitted proposed instructions
to counsel far enough in advance of delivery to the jury to give
counsel a reasonable time to examine and inspect the instructions.
In answer to the trial court judge's question, the State's attorney
stated that he had no objections to the instructions. After a judg-
ment against it, the State attempted to raise objections to the
instructions before the Supreme Court which determined that, by
answering the question and approving the instructions, counsel had
elected to accept the instructions as given.
Justice Spencer, writing the majority opinion in the Beveridge
decision found that the court alone had the responsibility to cor-
rectly instruct the jury,30 and counsel had absolutely no duty to
approve or disapprove instructions proposed by the court. Under
this formulation, only when the attorney actually does approve the
instructions will he be precluded from contending on appeal that
there were errors in those instructions.31
In the concurring opinion,3 2 stating the position of four justices,33
the primary duty for correctly instructing the jury was also placed
upon the trial court. However, in their view, the attorney has the
duty to assist the trial judge, and cannot "avoid responsibility by
declining comment." 34
The concurring opinion stated the position held by a majority
of the Nebraska Supreme Court. The exact implications of this
opinion cannot be ascertained from the rather cursory discussion.
The opinion would, however, require an answer to any question
by the trial judge about the proposed instructions. Whether a failure
to make specific objections would preclude later appeal would
"depend upon the seriousness of the defects, the difficulty involved
28 183 Neb. 406, 160 N.W.2d 229 (1968).
29 Id.
30 See Derr v. Grunnel, 127 Neb. 708, 256 N.W. 725 (1934).
31 See Ballantyne v. Parroitt, 172 Neb. 215, 109 N.W.2d 164 (1961);
Baylor v. Tyrrell, 177 Neb. 812, 131 N.W.2d 393 (1964).
32 Beveridge v. State 183 Neb. 406, 410, 160 N.W.2d 229, 231 (1968).
33 White, C. J., Boslaugh, Smith, and McCown, JJ.
34 Beveridge v. State, 183 Neb. 406, 410, 160 N.W.2d 229, 231 (1968).
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in discovering the defects, and other similar factors."3 5 An attorney
could not, under this statement, refuse to object to a known error
with an eye toward appeal in the case of an adverse decision.
The concurring opinion clearly represents a movement toward
the federal procedure, which, under Federal Rule 51,36 requires an
attorney to object prior to the retiring of the jury. Where counsel
does not make specific objections to the instructions at that time,
or has not submitted written requests for instructions, he waives
his objections.
This requirement is for the protection of the judge as well as the
parties. His attention must be called to any omissions or mistakes
in his charge in order that he may have an opportunity to correct
them before the jury finally retires. If these errors are not made
clear by specific objections they cannot later furnish grounds for
attacking the verdict. Thus the necessity of a retrial is avoided
where by design or through sheer neglect the losing party fails to
raise points during the progress of the case in the trial court3 7
General objections which do not set out specific errors in the
instructions and thereby do not allow for correction by the trial
judge are "wholly ineffective" and will not be sufficient to raise
issues on the instructions on appeal.3 8 Furthermore, objections to
instructions raised in the appeal cannot be different from that made
in the trial court prior to the retiring of the jury.39
The standard for objection set out in the concurring opinion
is not as demanding as that required by the Federal Rules since
failure to object in the Nebraska courts will not automatically
preclude appeal on the basis of errors in the instructions. How-
ever, the obvious purpose of the opinion is to place a duty on counsel
to inform the court of errors in its instructions and avoid appeals
and retrials on points which could and should have been corrected
in the original trial.
35 Id.
36 FED. R. Civ. P. 51: "At the close of the evidence or at such earlier
time during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may
file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as
set forth in the requests. The court shall inform counsel of its pro-
posed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury,
but the court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed.
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider
its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the
grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the
objection out of hearing of the jury."
37 2B W. BARRON m A. HoLTzor, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1101, p. 440 (1961).
38 Lowe v. Taylor Steel Products Co., 373 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1967); Bern
v. Evans, 349 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1967).
39 Siegpried v. Kansas City Star Company, 298 F.2d 1 (8th cir. 1962).
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The Nebraska Supreme Court has adopted a rule with reference
to jury instructions requiring the use of Nebraska Jury Instructions
where applicable.40 The rule states that:
The trial court may, and ordinarily should, hold a conference
before or during the trial with reference to the preparation of
proposed instructions. The trial court may direct counsel for either
party to prepare designated instructions. Counsel may object at
the conference on instructions to any instruction regardless of
who prepared it. At the conference on instructions each counsel
should aid the trial court by stating any specific objection that
he has on any instruction proposed to be given.41
The pattern jury instructions set out in the Nebraska Jury In-
structions42 will avoid error in many cases. The requirement in
the concurring opinion of the Beveridge case that the attorney
respond, and the rule adopted by the Supreme Court, make it
mandatory that an attorney be prepared to raise specific objections
to instructions at the trial.
B. BERIGAN BROS. v. GROWERS CATTLE CREDIT CoRP.
4 3
Under what circumstances a petition for declaratory judgment
can be filed, and the issues raised thereby determined, after an
action involving the same transaction had been initiated in the trial
court was the central issue in this case. The petition for a declara-
tory judgment was filed subsequent to an action initiated by
Growers Cattle Corporation against three defendants, including
Berigan Brothers, for conversion of cattle. In the earlier action all
three defendants answered, and one defendant ified a cross petition.
Berigan Brothers, by their answer, claimed no interest in the
cattle other than a commission for their sale, and that the receipts
from the sale had been paid to another of the defendants. The trial
court, upon the plaintiff's motion, struck this portion of the answer
and the cross-claim, limiting the issues to the ownership of the
proceeds.
40 NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
NEBRASKA JURY INSTRUCTIONs, IX (1969), Rule Adopted by the
Supreme Court with Reference to Nebraska Jury Instructions: "When-
ever Nebraska Jury Instructions contains an instruction applicable
in a Civil or Criminal Case, and the Court, giving due consideration
to the facts and the prevailing law, determines that the jury should
be instructed on the subject, the Nebraska Jury Instruction shall be
used.
41 Id. (Emphasis added)
42 Id.
43 182 Neb. 656, 156 N.W.2d 794 (1968).
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Berigan Brothers then fied a petition for declaratory judgment,
praying for a determination of the rights of the parties with regard
to the entire transaction, stating that such a determination would
prevent a multiplicity of actions and eliminate possible intervention
of the statute of limitations. The district court for Douglas County
sustained a demurrer to the petition, but the Nebraska Supreme
Court reversed, finding that the rights of all interested parties
could not be adjudicated in the original action (which had been
limited to a determination of the ownership of the proceeds) and
that the purpose of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act44 was
to dispose of cases such as this in which multiple suits would be
necessary to determine the legal relations of the parties. That is, in
the declaratory judgment action the court could determine not only
who was entitled to the proceeds of the sale, but also who should
ultimately be responsible for them.
As a general rule, an action for declaratory judgment cannot
be used to supersede any pending action in which the rights of the
parties can be determined.45 However, the Court distinguished the
Berigan Brothers case in the following manner:
It is quite evident here that the rights of the parties are so inter-
woven that a suit awarding judgment against one defendant would
have the effect of making him a potential plaintiff in a subsequent
action .... There are several claims in the instant case in which the
evidence is in conflict. The claims are justiciable. They are inter-
mingled. The petition for a declaratory judgment would avoid
a multiplicity of suits that would be time consuming and costly.
The law ... is that an order is final for the purposes of an appeal
when it determines the rights of the parties; and no further ques-
tions can arise before the court rendering it except such as are
necessary to be determined in carrying it into effect.46
The application of declaratory judgment as a remedy has tradi-
tionally been limited by the Nebraska Supreme Court to situations
44 NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-21,149 to -21,164 (Reissue 1964). See generally
Schumacher, Declaratory Judgments in Nebraska, 45 NFm. L. REV.
754 (1966); Potts, Some Practical Uses of the Declaratory Judgment
Law, 23 Nm. L. REv. 189 (1944).
45 Phelps County v. City of Holdrege, 133 Neb. 139, 274 N.W. 483 (1937);
Scudder v. Buffalo County, 170 Neb. 293, 102 N.W.2d 447 (1960). Of
course an action for declaratory judgment will not be allowed to oust
a court of jurisdiction in an action filed after the action for declaratoryjudgment where the subsequent action provides an adequate remedy.
Blanco v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 180 Neb. 365, 143 N.W.2d
257 (1966); State ex rel. Meyer v. Sorrell, 174 Neb. 340, 117 N.W.2d 872
(1962).
46 Berigan Bros. v. Growers Cattle Credit Corp., 182 Neb. 656, 662, 15F
N.W.2d 790, 798 (1968).
998 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 48, NO. 4 (1969)
in which a party has no other "equally servicable remedy.147 The
Court has viewed the declaratory judgment action as a "statutory
expansion of equity jurisdiction," and thus has insisted "that the
equitable requirement of lack of another adequate remedy be main-
tained as a jurisdictional prerequisite for declaratory relief.148
In reaching the decision in Berigan Brothers the Supreme Court
applied equitable principles established before the adoption of the
declaratory judgment statute. In Finzer v. Peter49 the court had,
through its equitable powers, allowed the determination of all the
parties' rights to avoid a circuity of actions. That action involved
the liability of grantees and grantors of real property on a prior
mortgage, though the original action had been brought at law on
the note given with the mortgage.
In future decisions on whether to supersede prior actions by
declaratory judgment actions the court will look to the factors set
out in prior cases. Clearly an action for declaratory judgment will
not be sustained where the transaction has previously been litigated
to completion in the trial court,5° or where there is a specific statu-
tory remedy provided by the legislature.5 1
The Berigan Brothers decision outlined a number of factors
which will move the court to allow an action for declaratory judg-
ment to supersede a prior action brought on the same transaction.
The most important factor is the likelihood of a multiplicity of suits
which would be readily apparent where virtually any possible
decision in the initial action is likely to make further proceedings
both necessary and probable. This situation arises where all claims
cannot be adjudicated in the original action, and the claims are
the result of a single commingled transaction. Declaratory judg-
ments will be entertained where it will "afford (all the parties)
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status,
and other legal relations."52 The court will, of course, not allow a
declaratory judgment where all the parties are not before the court,
and all rights and duties cannot be finally settled by the decision.
53
47 Murphy v. Holt County Com. of Reorgan. of School Dist., 181 Neb.
182, 147 N.W.2d 522 (1966); Strawn v. County of Sarpy, 146 Neb. 783,
21 N.W.2d 597 (1946).
48 Schumacher, Declaratory Judgments in Nebraska, 45 NEB. L. REv. 754
(1966).
49 120 Neb. 389, 232 N.W. 762 (1930).
50 Phelps County v. City of Holdrege, 133 Neb. 139, 274 N.W. 483 (1937).
51 Scudder v. Buffalo County 170 Neb. 293, 102 N.W.2d 447 (1960).
52 Berigan Bros. v. Growers Cattle Credit Corp., 182 Neb. 656, 663, 156
N.W.2d 790, 798 (1968).
53 Marsh v. Marsh, 173 Neb. 282, 113 N.W.2d 332 (1962); Dobson v. Ocean
Accident & Guarantee Corp., 124 Neb. 652, 274 N.W. 789 (1933).
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There are two general issues to which the court should look
in determining whether an action for declaratory judgment will be
allowed to supersede a prior, more traditional method of deter-
mining the rights of the parties. 4 First, the court must determine
the legal relationship between the parties, and, if this is in issue,
whether the determination of a relationship in the initial action
will alter the relationships between other parties. To what extent
are the legal relations of the parties intermingled? Second, the
court must decide whether the rights, status and relationships of
the parties can be satisfactorily determined in the initial action,
without unnecessary delay or waste of the court's time and client's
money. Can the rights of the parties be fairly and adequately
litigated in the original action?
The presumption is, of course, with the initial action and the
party asking for a declaratory judgment will have to satisfy the
court as to the necessity of superseding that action. Permitting
an action for declaratory judgment to supersede a prior action is a
procedural device which must be used sparingly, but should not be
unduly limited where it would more adequately and efficiently
resolve the rights of the parties.
C. BEs V. lMATULKAG5
On appeal from an order of the trial court sustaining a motion to
strike a counterclaim, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the
determination on such a motion in the trial court was not a final
order and therefore it was not appealable while the original action
was pending in the district court. The Court further determined
that a counterclaim for malicious prosecution and slanderous state-
ments could not be maintained in an action for conversion.
The statute of limitations on actions for slanderous statements
and malicious prosecution is one year. 6 The counterclaim in this
case was filed within one year of the date of the alleged statements,
but the year had passed when the trial court sustained the plaintiff's
motion to strike the counterclaim. The defendant, therefore, at-
tempted to have his counterclaim reinstated on appeal in order to
avoid being precluded by the statute of limitations from bringing
the action for slander and malicious prosecution. 7
54 See, E. BoRCHAERD, DECLARATORY JUDGivENTS 350-54 (1941). See also
Natural Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Lippert Bros. Inc.,
233 F. Supp. 650 (D.C. Neb. 1964) (District Judge Van Pelt discussed
the problems of superseding prior actions under the Federal Rules).
55 182 Neb. 744, 157 N.W.2d 832 (1968).
56 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-208 (Reissue 1964).
57 Brief for Appellant at 3, Benes v. Matulka, 182 Neb. 744, 157 N.W.2d
832 (1968).
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Under these conditions, the defendant contended that the ruling
of the trial court was a "final order" from which an appeal may
be taken under section 25-1902 of the Nebraska statutes. 8 The
defendant's theory rested on the proposition that a counterclaim
is an independent cause of action,5 9 and that the decision in the
trial court had effectively precluded any judgment on the cause
of action.
The authority for defendant's assertion that the ruling in this
case was a final order from which an appeal could be taken was
Atkins v. Chamberlain,60 a case in which the plaintiff's petition
stated three causes of action. The trial court sustained a demurrer
to one of the three stated causes of action, and the Supreme Court
determined that such a ruling was reviewable as a final order. The
Supreme Court in that case noted that the ruling in the trial court
had effectively prevented a judgment on that cause of action, but did
not comment upon the fact that the ruling could just as well have
been reviewed after all the issues had been determined by the trial
court.
The Atkins decision, which was not cited by the Supreme Court
in the Benes decision, would certainly seem applicable to this recent
determination. In both cases a cause of action in favor of one of the
parties was effectively precluded by a ruling in the trial court.
Further, the appeal of the counterclaim in the Benes case precluded
the entire action by the defendant, unlike the Atkins case in which
only a part of the plaintiff's claim was prevented. The single pos-
sible distinguishing point is that the Atkins cause of action was
specifically dismissed with prejudice, though in the Benes case the
cause of action was just as effectively prevented.
Other cases in which the trial court decisions on motions have
been found reviewable as final orders are instances in which the
motion had effectively prevented the entire action with no other
possible avenue of appeal available; such as an order overruling an
application to set aside a default judgment,61 an order refusing to
58 That statute provides: "An order affecting a substantial right in
action, when such order determines the action and prevents a judg-
ment ... is a final order which may be vacated, modified or reversed
as provided in this chapter." NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1902 (Reissue 1964).
The Supreme Court reviews final orders under Section 25-1911,
NE. RE V. STAT. (Reissue 1964), which provides: "A judgment entered
or a final order made by the district court may be reversed, vacated
or modified by the Supreme Court for errors upon the record."
59 Dale v. Huneman, 12 Neb. 221, 10 N.W. 112 (1881).
60 164 Neb. 428, 82 N.W.2d 632 (1957) (The appeal was finally dismissed
because the appeal had not been filed within the proper time).
61 Steele v. Haynes, 20 Neb. 316, 30 N.W. 63 (1886).
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permit the filing of a petition of intervention,62 an order of the
county court refusing an application to file a claim against an
estate,6 3 or an order refusing to allow notice of appeal to be filed
out of time.64 In each of these cases the entire action was precluded;
there was no action left pending from which an appeal might later
be taken.
However, an order refusing summary judgment is not a final
order since it does not determine the action or prevent a judgment,65
nor is the sustaining of a motion to make more definite and certain. 66
In Rehn v. Bingaman67 the court stated:
The law... is that an order is final for the purposes of an appeal
when it determines the rights of the parties; and no further ques-
tions can arise before the court rendering it except such as are
necessary to be determined in carrying it into effect.
The Atkins decision is distinctive in permitting appeal while an
action is pending in the lower court. If the Supreme Court wishes
to disapprove the decision, further confusion may be avoided by
express disapproval or clarification of the scope of the Benes ruling.
The view adopted by the Supreme Court in Benes v. Matulka s
will, generally, maintain the speed and efficiency in litigation which
would be lost if the litigation were held up while orders or motions
were reviewed by the Supreme Court. Though in some few
instances in which remand will be made necessary there will be a
duplication of effort, precluding review until all questions are




(1) In State v. Montgomery6 9 defendant and his companion were
tried together and represented by the same attorney. The com-
panion made a written confession inculpating the defendant, who
62 Harman v. Barhydt, 20 Neb. 625, 31 N.W. 488 (1886).
63 Ribble v. Furmin, 71 Neb. 108, 98 N.W. 420 (1904).
64 Pep Sinton, Inc. v. Thomas, 174 Neb. 540, 118 N.W.2d 616 (1962). See
Dorshorst v. Dorshorst, 174 Neb. 886, 120 N.W.2d 32 (1962), where the
trial court decision not to allow an antenuptial agreement as a defense
as a matter of law is a final order when the only other question in
the case was the amount of widow's allowance.65 Rehn v. Bingaman, 157 Neb. 467, 59 N.W.2d 614 (1953).
66 Barry v. Wolf, 148 Neb. 27,26 N.W.2d 303 (1947).
67 Rehn v. Bingaman, 157 Neb. 467, 472, 59 N.W.2d 614, 618 (1953).
68 182 Neb. 744, 157 N.W.2d 832 (1968).
69 182 Neb. 737, 157 N.W.2d 196 (1968).
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steadfastly denied its content. After the State had called five
witnesses and nearly completed its case, the confession was intro-
duced into evidence. Defendant's appointed counsel had not been
given a copy of the confession until immediately prior to the begin-
ning of the trial, and as a result delayed moving for separate trials
(severance). The lower court denied the motion and the Nebraska
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant was prejudiced
by the introduction of the confession, and the resulting conflict was
sufficient to deny him effective assistance of counsel.
Nebraska law provides that two or more defendants may be
charged in the same indictment if it is alleged that they participated
in the same act or transaction constituting the offense.70 A sever-
ance may be ordered by the court if "it appears that a defendant
... would be prejudiced by a joinder of... defendants in an indict-
ment . . . for trial together .... ,"71 The majority opinion talks in
constitutional terms (lack of effective counsel) but couches its
holding in the language of the statute. In addition, the decision is
something less than clear in regard to the definition of the statutory
requirement of "prejudice." Must there be actual proven "preju-
dice" to the defendant, or will the mere presence of "conflict of
interest"72 be a sufficient basis for granting the motion to sever?
The court relies primarily upon a Fourth Circuit decision as
authority for their holding.7 3 In Sawyer v. Brough two defendants
were tried together and a confession of one was offered which ex-
pressly inculpated the other. This offer came as a complete surprise
to the court-appointed counsel. The court held that introduction of
the confession of one defendant coupled with continued denials of
guilt from the other created an inherent divergence of interest,
placing the defendants in adversary positions and that the possibility
of harm was sufficient to impair the validity of the conviction.74
The court also referred to a Pennsylvania decision7 5 which held that
70 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2002 (Reissue 1964).
71 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2002 (4) (Reissue 1964) (emphasis added).
72 The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel
contemplates assistance of counsel free from impairment by an order
requiring the simultaneous representation of conflicting interests
and that such right does not require a finding of actual harm. Glasser
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). The issue may also be raised
in light of this decision whether the Nebraska statute conforms to
these constitutional guidelines established by the Supreme Court.
Since the Nebraska statute requires actual prejudice, it could be
argued that the statute is unconstitutional.
73 Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1966).
74 Id. at 73.
75 Commonwealth v. Russell, 406 Pa. 45, 176 A.2d 641 (1962).
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mere conflicting interests invalidate the proceedings, regardless of
whether actual harm results. These cases could certainly be author-
ity for the proposition that Nebraska's "prejudice" requirement
demands nothing more than a conflict of interest between two
defendants as a condition precedent to a successful motion to sever.
This proposition is further strengthened by the Nebraska court's
reference to the recommendations of the American Bar Association's
Advisory Committee on the Criminal Trial which does not mention
a requirement of actual prejudice. Rather, the Committee suggests
that the court elect (1) not to admit the statements; (2) to delete
references to the defendant; or (3) to sever the trials .7 6
However, in a situation where the confession of one defendant
specifically refers to another defendant, the better result requires
actual prejudice to the non-confessing defendant before severance
will be granted. Such a rule would serve to expedite justice while
at the same time preserve constitutionally guaranteed rights. The
underlying rationale is clear: by requiring a severance where
prejudice exists the attorney is prohibited from placing himself
in a position where he will be required to choose between con-
flicting duties owing to each client while still being permitted to
represent each effectively where no possibility of prejudice exists.
Montgomery also raises a question relating to the attorney's
responsibility to move for a severance. The State argued that since
counsel had delayed making his motion for severance, he had waived
the opportunity. In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that
since counsel had not received the statement until the day of the
trial, he was not afforded "sufficient time to investigate the
circumstances [and] absent ... a reasonable opportunity to make
such an investigation, [the State could not] say that the motion...
was untimely made. 177 This holding places the onus of raising
an objection upon counsel for the defendants.
At least one jurisdiction has held that it is the responsibility of
the trial judge to inquire of the attorney whether he has evaluated
potential conflicts in a joint representation, and to make an affirma-
tive determination as to the defendant's awareness of the possible
dangers which are inherent in any joint representation.78 Thus the
responsibility of the attorney is partially eliminated and the failure
to move for severance does not constitute a waiver of that procedure.
76 A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO JonDER AM SEvERANc--TENTAVz DRAFT
7-8 (1967).
77 State v. Montgomery, 182 Neb. 737, 743, 157 N.W.2d 196, 200 (1968).
78 Lord v. District of Columbia, 235 A.2d 322 (D.C. 1967). See also
Morgan v. United States, 396 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1968).
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(2) In State v. Godfrey79 defendant and his companion were
stopped and questioned by the police in the vicinity of a recent
burglary. They were taken to police headquarters and while under-
going interrogation were advised of their constitutional rights. They
refused to make a statement, and at that point both were incarcer-
ated. Five hours later they again underwent interrogation and
were again advised of their rights. At this time defendants waived
their rights and the officers obtained a confession which was later
introduced into evidence.
Defendant was convicted and on appeal contended that the state-
ments were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. The
now famous Miranda"° decision clearly establishes that a defendant
in custody may at any time indicate his desire for an attorney and
all interrogation must cease whenever such desire is manifested to
the police. The right to have the attorney present continues during
any subsequent questioning. Extrapolating from this holding, de-
fendant argued that refusal to make a statement carries with it the
same protection as a request for counsel, and implies that no future
statements may be made without the presence of counsel; hence, the
subsequent warnings and waiver were of no effect. The Godfrey
decision, by rejecting this argument, simply requires a defendant
to affirmatively manifest his desire for an attorney.8 1 The court
seems to realize that mere formalistic compliance with minimum
standards is not important. Rather, the inquiry must focus upon
whether the accused has been meaningfully apprised of and has
intelligently waived his rights. This principle is too readily
obscured and must be kept in constant view to insure propriety in
the operation of the criminal law system, and each case must be
specifically examined to insure that any waiver was in fact both
knowing and intelligent.
At trial, defendant moved to waive his right to trial by jury
after the jury had been empanelled but before the actual trial had
begun. This motion was denied. On appeal the defendant contended
that the right to a jury trial was a personal right which may be
waived at any time, and that the State has no authority to require
a jury trial if there has been an intelligent waiver.
Three policy considerations support the right to waive a jury
trial: flexibility, avoidance of emotional verdicts inherent in certain
79 182 Neb. 451, 155 N.W.2d 438 (1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 937 (1968).
80 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
81 They do, however, recognize that the State may not continually har-
rass the defendant by continuing pressures inherent in interrogation
practices which are designed to break his will.
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types of cases, and expedition of the business of the court and of
the individual defendant's case.82 The Nebraska Supreme Court
held, however, that it is not unreasonable to require that a motion
to waive a jury trial be made or fied within a reasonable time prior
to the trial.83 The apparent basis for this ruling was a general policy
belief that the defendant should not be allowed to waive a jury
once the State has gone to the expense of empanelling one.
As long as policy considerations alone are controlling, there is
sound basis for the decision. The result may, however, involve a
constitutional problem: does the right to trial by jury conversely
imply the right not to have a jury? The United States Supreme
Court has stressed the importance of this right and a waiver thereof:
"[B]efore any waiver can become effective, the consent of the
government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, in
addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant."84
Assuming that acceptance of a waiver is preceded by a conscious
effort to insure the voluntary nature of a waiver of trial by jury,
this language could buttress an argument that waiver of this right
may not be denied. On the other hand, since the Supreme Court
specifically requires the trial court's sanction, it could be argued
that this sanction may be withheld on reasonable grounds, one of
which might well be timeliness.
(3) State v. Reizenstein 5 and State v. Oliva86 are cases con-
cerned in part with the voluntariness of confessions introduced into
evidence. Reizenstein was convicted of first degree murder for the
shotgun slaying of his wife. He had made some statements im-
mediately after the shooting which were recorded and compiled into
a transcript. The actual statements were never introduced into
evidence, but testimony was given by two officers present during
the interrogation concerning their recollections of what was said.87
In Oliva, defendant was convicted of second degree murder in con-
82 "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial,.. ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
83 Hopefully such a requirement will serve to promote the efficient
administration of justice. It seems quite reasonable to hold that the
defendant must waive the jury trial before the process for selection
has begun. On the other hand, the argument is strong that the right
is personal and subject to waiver at any time in order to guarantee
the right to a speedy trial.
84 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312-13 (1930) (emphasis added).
85 183 Neb. 376, 160 N.W.2d 208 (1968).
86 183 Neb. 620, 163 N.W.2d 112 (1968).
87 The officers who testified "refreshed" their memories by referring
to this 69 page document. No specific judicial determination of the
voluntariness of these statements was made upon objection of counsel.
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nection with the shooting death of her uncle. After the shooting
occurred, defendant made some statements to a taxi driver and
also to the police. These statements were introduced into evidence
without objection. On appeal defendant alleged that the lower
court committed reversible error by not determining the volun-
tariness of these statements, regardless of whether there had been
any objection to their introduction.88
A central issue conjunctively raised by the two cases is whether,
in Nebraska, the voluntariness of a confession must be determined
by the court on its own initiative or whether the defendant must
take some affirmative action to raise the issue such as objecting to
the introduction of the confession into evidence. In Reizenstein
there is language which seems to imply that the trial court is now
required to make an independent determination of the voluntariness
of a confession in light of Jackson v. Denno,89 regardless of whether
the defendant fails to object to its introduction. 0
In Oliva, the defendant did not object to the introduction of the
statements made to the taxi driver and to police. The court held
that this omission precluded the defendant from complaining "of
the failure of the court to hold [a hearing on the voluntary character
of the statement]. ' 91 In other words, if the defendant does not
object to the introduction of a confession or statements, their volun-
tary character need not be determined, which seems to be in conflict
with the result reached in Reizenstein.
Jackson v. Denno sets forth the defendant's basic obligation:
"Equally clear is the defendant's constitutional right at some stage
in the proceedings to object to the use of the confession and to have
a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of volun-
tariness. .... ,,92 This statement implies that if no objection is made,
the defendant may not later raise the issue on appeal, and it has
88 Reizenstein involved a proceeding under the Nebraska Post Convic-
tion Act, NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-3001 to -3004 (Supp. 1967), and
Oliva was a direct appeal from the district court.
89 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
90 183 Neb. 376, 380, 160 N.W.2d 208, 211 (1968). This language is, how-
ever, merely dictum since there was an objection raised by the
defendant's counsel at trial. Since some of these objections had been
sustained concerning the introduction of the evidence, the court held
that this was sufficient to be a judicial determination of their volun-
tary character. Id.
91 183 Neb. 620, 625, 163 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1968).
92 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964).
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generally been so interpreted.93 But perhaps the better procedure
would be to require that any confession or inculpating statement
made by the defendant should first be submitted to the court for a
determination of its voluntary character, and a failure to object to
these statements should not preclude a court on appeal from deter-
mining the issue. That is, the great importance of such statements
in the determination of guilt or innocence seems almost to neces-
sitate that they be admitted only after having been found to be
the product of the defendant's unimpinged free will.
In Reizenstein the court held that it was unnecessary to submit
the question of the voluntariness of the statements to the jury since
the determination by the trial judge was final on the issue. In his
dissent, Justice McCown viewed the question as essentially one of
fact which must be submitted to the jury 4 In light of Parker v.
State,95 which stated that the voluntary character of a confession
was a question of fact for the jury, it seems that the court has
reached the wrong result.98 The language of Parker indicates that
the determination of the trial judge is not final on the issue, and the
question of voluntariness must be submitted to the triers of fact.
By thus having an initial determination by the trial judge outside
of the presence of the jury, followed by a final determination by
the triers of fact, the defendant is assured the most complete deter-
mination that the statements were not in fact coerced.
(5) In State v. Simants,97 defendants were convicted in county
court of contributing to the delinquency of a fourteen year old
female minor. On removal to the district court the statute under
which the defendants were charged 9s was held to be unconstitu-
tionally void for vagueness. The State appealed and the Nebraska
Supreme Court reversed, holding that because of the vast number
93 People v. Nash, 67 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1968); Blatch v. State, 216 So.2d
261 (Fla. 1968); People v. Fortman, 64 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1967); The
rationale is, evidently, that such failure does not constitute funda-
mental error. Simpson v. State, 211 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1967). But see
In 'e Cameron, 67 Cal. Rptr. 529, 439 P.2d 633 (1968), where the
court held that the defendant is not precluded from challenging on
appeal the admissibility of a confession that is involuntary as a matter
of law, even though he did not object.
94 183 Neb. 376, 389-90, 160 N.W.2d 208, 216 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
95 164 Neb. 614, 83 N.W.2d 347 (1957).
96 The court held that since the statements made by defendant could
not be denied and were in fact self-serving in nature, they could
not be objected to in a proceeding under the Post Conviction Act.
This does not, however, answer the question of whether the volun-
tary nature of the statements is a jury question.
97 182 Neb. 491, 155 N.W.2d 788 (1968).
98 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-477 (Reissue 1964).
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of acts which could constitute the offense of "contributing to the
delinquency of a minor," it was impossible to specify each prohibited
act. Therefore, such a statute must, of necessity, be broadly drawn
and could not be deemed unconstitutionally void for vagueness.
It is axiomatic that a criminal statute must be reasonably definite
and clear. Defendants contended that since the act literally included
unintentional as well as intentional acts, there was noncompliance
with the constitutional minimum standard that a crime must be
defined in such a manner as to inform one charged with its violation
that the act is proscribed by statute 9 While a statute cannot be
so vague as to make criminal an innocent act,'00 it need not be
so definite as to exclude the possibility of more than one construc-
tion. 0 1 All that is needed to conform to constitutional standards is
that the language convey a warning as to the proscribed conduct.10 2
While the court was only confronted with the issue of the con-
stitutionality of the statute, Justice McCown expressed fear that
the majority has gone beyond the constitutional determination. The
majority failed to note that nowhere in the record was it disclosed
precisely what act was committed by the defendants. Since they
were merely charged in the language of the statute, and the court
does not concern itself with this question, Justice McCown's fear is
that the information need not specify the acts committed. This in
turn would not sufficiently inform the defendant of the nature of his
offense, thereby failing to meet the minimal constitutional standards
of notice and fair play. On remand it is assumed that the defendants
will object to the information on the ground that it does not state
a cause of action since it does not specify the particular acts suffi-
cient to give the defendants notice of the violation. If that course
of action is not followed, however, an information charging only
that defendants "contributed to the delinquency of a minor" may
well be sufficient to support a conviction.
Because it is impractical to prohibit each act that may reasonably
be expected to cause, encourage, or contribute to the minor's
delinquency, it necessarily follows that it is even more important
to insure that any indictment specify and explicate the specific acts
constituting the crime. Only where the statute sets forth the par-
99 Brief for Appellee at 13-15, State v. Simants, 182 Neb. 491, 155
N.W.2d 788 (1968).
100 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
101 State v. Lovell, 181 Neb. 401, 149 N.W.2d 46 (1967).
102 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Evidently the warning
conveyed by the statute is that the proscribed conduct is anything
which one might assume would tend to cause or contribute to the
delinquency of a minor child, which is, arguably, no warning at all.
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ticular elements of a crime in such a manner as to properly inform
the defendant of the nature of the prohibited offense, will it be
sufficient to charge in the language of the statute. Indeed, by citing
decisions which specifically require that the information specify
the acts committed, the majority seemingly recognizes this general
rule. It is unfortunate that they did not seize the opportunity to
clarify their position, since they could easily have held the statute
constitutional, but the information insufficient to constitute a cause
of action. If upon remand no amendment is made to the informa-
tion, the inference will certainly be raised that one charged simply
with "contributing to the delinquency of a minor" may be under an
indictment sufficient to lead to his incarceration.
10 3
(6) State v. Forney'" arose after defendant was stopped by a
police officer in Gordon, Nebraska, in the early hours of the morning.
The officer had observed defendant for nearly forty minutes prior
to his detainment, and upon request the defendant voluntarily went
to the Gordon police station where he and his companion were
questioned. Mr. Forney was informed that there had been a break-in
at Merriman, Nebraska, east of Gordon, 0 5 and was asked if his car
could be searched. His consent was given and the search disclosed
a concealed weapon and a blue cloth bag containing some coins.
No search warrant was obtained.10 Defendant was then placed
under arrest, informed of his constitutional rights, and charged
with carrying a concealed weapon and grand larceny.
The trial court sustained a motion to suppress the evidence taken
from the automobile, the State filed an application for summary
review, and the case was appealed. Justice Spencer, in a one-man
103 As the Nebraska statute is set out, it is probably not necessary to
allege that the minor child has in fact become delinquent. Generally
such an allegation is not required under statutes similar to the one
in the instant case. The court does not, however, answer this ques-
tion. If it were determined to be necessary to make such an allega-
tion, then it would further be necessary to determine whether proof
of delinquency would be required where the accused was charged
with contributing to the minor's delinquency only, or, where he is
merely acting so as to tend to cause the minor child to become delin-
quent, if the burden of proof is less. These questions remain unan-
swered, but loom on the horizon for future determination. Some of
the cases are collected in Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 824 (1968).
104 182 Neb. 802, 157 N.W.2d 403 (1968).
105 When asked from where he came, defendant told the officer that
he had been in Rushville, which is located west of Gordon. The
officer had observed the defendant's car approach from the east.
106 The officer testified that he had observed the defendant earlier in
the evening, but had not procurred a warrant either to search or for
the defendant's arrest, although he had had ample opportunity to
procure either one.
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opinion, reversed the district judge.1'07 Defendant was convicted
and appealed, contending that the Miranda warnings 0 8 must be
given before any consent to search may be obtained, and since the
police had failed to give these warnings the subsequent search was
rendered invalid. The Nebraska Supreme Court in affirming the
conviction held that probable cause for the search existed, and that
a person need not be warned that he does not have to submit to a
search, and that anything discovered in the search could be used
against him, before he may validly consent to a search.
The court's holding in Forney is extremely confusing in light of
the fact that they found probable cause existed for the warrantless
search. Such a search does not contravene the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. It is un-
likely that a warrantless search based upon sufficient probable cause
requires, in addition, the consent of the defendant. The question of
knowing consent to search is an important concept only where it
operates as a waiver to an otherwise unreasonable arrest or search.
Kansas'0 9 and Maryland 110 decisions have held that a search is
not illegal merely because of a failure to advise the defendant of
his right not to consent."' But these decisions found independent
probable cause for the search and thus the issue was not whether
the defendant must be given the Miranda warnings prior to giving
his consent to a search which is otherwise unreasonable under the
fourth amendment in order that the consent may operate as a
waiver of his rights under that amendment. Rather, the issue was
whether, in addition to the existence of probable cause, a search
107 State v. Forney, 181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915 (1967).
108 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The warnings necessitated by
this decision are that the defendant has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he makes may be used against him, that he has
a right to an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, he
will be provided one at the State's expense. In the argument, defend-
ant attempted to extrapolate these warnings to apply to the rights
guaranteed by the fourth amendment, and that he should have been
advised that he need not consent to the search, and that if he did,
anything found could be used against him.
109 State v. McCarty, 199 Kan. 116, 427 P.2d 616 (1967).
110 Lamot v. State, 2 Md. App. 378, 234 A.2d 615 (1967); Morgan v. State,
2 Md. App. 440, 234 A.2d 762 (1967).
111 In Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (lst Cir. 1967), the court
held that it was unnecessary to warn the defendant specifically that
he need not consent to the search and that anything found may be
used against him. The reason was that this warning was inherent in
the initial warnings given to the defendant at the outset of the inter-
rogation. Thus Gorman implies that there must be at least some warn-
ing, and is questionable authority for the court in the instant case.
Id. at 164.
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must have consent preceded by those warnings. The decisions from
other jurisdictions, which are interdependent for authority upon
one another, justify the result on the concept that the fourth and
fifth amendment protect different rights. Thus, the fifth amend-
ment protection against incriminating statements is not applicable
to the fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The general rule is that a waiver of one's fourth amendment
rights (consent to search) must be knowing and voluntary before
'the subsequent warrantless search, which is not based on probable
cause, is deemed reasonable.1 12 Since the consent serves as a waiver
of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the
courts must be assured that the waiver is voluntary. In United
States v. Nikrasch,113 the court held that a warrantless search
lacked probable cause and was not justified as being incidental to a
lawful arrest because it was too remote in time from the arrest.
Therefore, the consent of the defendant (waiver) was necessary if
the search was not to be considered unreasonable and in violation
of the fourth amendment. But, since the defendant had not been
apprised of his rights under the fourth amendment, no true consent
had been given, and the search was unreasonable.
In United States v. Blatock,"4 the court recognized that a war-
rantless search is regarded as unreasonable and that to eliminate
the taint of unreasonableness the defendant's consent must be ob-
tained. This waiver of defendant's fourth amendment rights must
meet the test of being an "intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right."116 Since the waiver must be voluntary, it
must also be intelligent simply because one may not intelligently
waive something which he does not know he has. Therefore, the
fourth amendment requires no less a knowing waiver than do the
fifth and sixth." 6 The knowledge requirement serves the same
purpose: to insure that the ignorant may not be forced to relinquish
their rights more readily than the shrewd." 7 In both cases, probable
cause for a warrantless search did not exist, and therefore it was
necessary to reach the issue of whether the fourth amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures had been
waived by the defendant's consent.
12 See Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 858, 864 (1966).
113 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966).
114 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
115 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
116 United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
117 Id.
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In State v. Williams,"8 the defendant was arrested on a vagrancy
violation and was subsequently convicted for burglary. The court
held that since the vagrancy violation was designed to preclude
defendant from leaving the city until the suspicions of the police
had been confirmed concerning the burglary, the initial arrest was
illegal." 9 And because the defendant was undergoing in-custody
interrogation at the time, having become a focal suspect in the
burglary, the warnings prior to waiver of his fourth amendment
rights were necessary under the principles announced in Escobedo
v. IUlinois,120 since, in effect, the request to search is a request that
the defendant be a witness against himself. The same prophylaxis
against unreasonable and coercive police practices is a constitutional
necessity regardless of whether the design is to establish guilt
by obtaining a confession or disclosing evidence pointing to that
guilt.121
In an effort to refrain from "further shackling law enforce-
ment,"'122 the court has reached an incorrect result in its holding
relating to the issue of whether consent to search without prior
warnings is a knowing waiver. If probable cause existed for the
warrantless search, then the issue of voluntary waiver need not have
been raised. But if no probable cause for the warrantless search
existed, then the search would have been unreasonable, absent a
knowing waiver of the protection of the fourth amendment. The fact
that the defendant was in custody (although not under arrest) and
thereby under pressure from authority, is enough to make the con-
sent involuntary, and the waiver invalid. Only upon being advised
of his constitutional rights could the consent truly be deemed
voluntary.
(7) In State v. Heiser123 Lincoln police officers went to the de-
fendant's home and attempted to gain entrance because they had
information that a marijuana party was in progress. 24 When they
'Is 432 P.2d 679 (Ore. 1967).
119 The court did not say, however, that since the arrest was illegal,
the search incidental to that arrest was likewise unlawful.
120 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
121 The Oregon court specifically declined to decide the issue of whether
the same prophylaxis against coercive police practices is necessary
in a situation where there is probable cause justifying a basis for
the issuance of a search warrant. 432 P.2d 679, 683 n.4 (Ore. 1967).
At least this court has recognized the issue involved and some of its
ramifications.
122 State v. Forney, 181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915 (1967).
123 183 Neb. 665, 163 N.W.2d 582 (1968).
124 An employee of the Lincoln Municipal court had informed the officers
approximately one hour earlier that the party was in progress, and
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admitted that they did not possess a search warrant, entrance was
refused.'1 An officer at the back of the house then saw the defendant
run to the kitchen, grab two containers, and throw them out of a
window. The officers at the front door were finally admitted by a
guest of the defendant 2 6 and detected the odor of marijuana. At
this point defendant was arrested and given the M~iranda warnings.
The officers testified that defendant's permission was given to search
the rest of the house; their search produced a container of marijuana
which was introduced at trial. Defendant constantly denied giving
his permission or consent to the search, and the only objection
raised at trial was to the evidence obtained in this search. De-
fendant was convicted and he appealed.
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the evidence objected to
was obtained as the result of a legal search and seizure. Although
warrantless, the search was incidental to a lawful arrest and there-
fore not unreasonable.127 If it is assumed that the arrest itself was
based on sufficient probable cause there can be no dispute with the
majority's decision. But if there was insufficient probable cause for
the arrest, then it was invalid and the search made pursuant to that
arrest must also fall as unreasonable.
The required standard for an arrest is "probable cause" which is
normally defined as a belief derived from reliable facts and cir-
cumstances within the knowledge of the officer sufficient to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been
committed . 2s At the time of the arrest, the officers had information
(1) that a marijuana party was progressing, (2) at defendant's
house, (3) that he had refused them entrance when informed that
the officers did not have a search warrant. They also knew that
to substantiate her story she presented a container of marijuana,
allegedly taken from the defendant's house. It was conceded by the
State that she was not a "reliable informer."
125 There is nothing in the record to explain why a search warrant was
not obtained since there was ample time to procure one, assuming
that there was sufficient probable cause. This fact leads one to assume
that there may not have been a belief on the part of the officers that
probable cause did exist.
126 It is interesting to point out that the "guest" who admitted the
officers was none other than the informing employee.
127 See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20(1925); United States ex rel. Foose v. Rundle, 389 F.2d 54 (3rd Cir.
1968); Oelke v. United States, 389 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1967); Bailey v.
United States, 389 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
128 State v. Perez, 180 Neb. 680, 157 N.W.2d 162 (1968); State v. Cook,
182 Neb. 684, 157 N.W.2d 151 (1968); State v. Watson, 182 Neb. 692,
157 N.W.2d 156 (1968).
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(4) defendant ran from the door, (5) opened a window and, (6)
threw something out on the lawn. It was later discovered that the
containers on the lawn were filled with marijuana. At the time of
the arrest the officers did not know what was in the containers.
There is language in the opinion which leads one to conclude
that Justice Newton is partially justifying the probable cause for
the arrest on the fact that the containers allegedly thrown out of
the window did in fact contain marijuana.1 29 Since this fact was not
known until after the arrest, it cannot be used to establish probable
cause for the arrest and ensuing search. A search cannot be justified
on the basis that facts giving rise to probable cause for arresting a
person were discovered after the arrest.13 0 The argument is clearly
bootstrapping,131 and perhaps in its rush to judgment, the Nebraska
Court has relied to a certain extent on hindsight as a basis for
holding that there was sufficient probable cause to justify an arrest
and the search incidental thereto.
Assuming that there was insufficient probable cause to justify
the arrest, thereby making the search unreasonable, the consent of
the defendant to the search arguably removes the taint of unreason-
ableness. The obvious argument against such an assertion would be
that the consent was obtained as a result of coercion. In Bumper v.
North Carolina,1 32 the United States Supreme Court held that a
search cannot be justified on the basis of consent when that "con-
sent" has been given only after the official conducting the search
has asserted that he possessed a warrant. An analogous situation
is presented where an individual is illegally arrested and subse-
quently consents to a search. It could be argued that the consent
to the search was the result of undue coercion brought about by the
arrest. Reasoning from Bumper, the State has the burden of show-
ing that the consent was given voluntarily. Certainly that obligation
cannot be satisfied by showing no more than mere acquiescence to
the authority of the State.
Each individual case necessarily is controlled by its own par-
ticular facts in determining whether a search is justified. The law
is necessarily too general in this area to function without a large
element of discretion. But it is better to have that discretion wielded
129 State v. Heiser, 183 Neb. 665, 666, 163 N.W.2d 582, 583 (1968).
130 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
131 To be used as evidence, marijuana must be the product of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest, and the arrest in turn must be based
on probable cause. Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963). The
constitutionality of the search depends on the constitutional validity
of the arrest. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
132 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
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by judicial officers unprejudiced by the pressures of the situation
rather than by the police. When viewed with the knowledge of
the officers prior to the arrest, without the assistance of hindsight,
it is questionable whether the warrantless search has met the con-
stitutional standards for justification. The holding is clearly
erroneous if the court has justified the arrest on the basis of hind-
sight. It is submitted that if the arrest was not based upon probable
cause, the search is not made reasonable by defendant's consent,
due to the coercion resulting from the arrest.
B. PaocEmuRE
(1) Defendant had brought an action under the Nebraska Post
Conviction Act' 3 in State v. Tunender3 4 alleging that his counsel
had rendered ineffective assistance. Tunender had been charged
with motor vehicle homicide and leaving the scene of a personal
injury accident. Initially, on the advice of his court-appointed
counsel, he pleaded not guilty to both counts. However, following
plea negotiations defendant changed his plea on the first charge to
guilty and the second charge was withdrawn.185 Tunender testified
that the attorney had promised him a sentence of probation if he
would thus change his plea, and that the guilty plea was entered
in reliance upon this promise.1 36
The question in Tunender was whether counsel had breached
his duty of loyalty and rendered ineffective assistance when he
erroneously promised either a reduced sentence or the probability
of a reduced sentence based upon plea negotiations with the county
attorney. The four justice majority held that there had been such
a breach. The majority opinion is devoid of any basic rationale to
support its decision. However, since the general rule that post
conviction relief will be granted only when the assistance of counsel
was so grossly inept as to shock the conscience of the court 37 was
Ma NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-3001 to -3004 (Supp. 1967).
134 182 Neb. 701, 157 N.W.2d 165 (1968), rehearing denied, 183 Neb. 242,
159 N.W.2d 320 (1968).135 The attorney testified that the county attorney had advised him that
nothing would be accomplished by sending the defendant to jail and
that there was a good chance for probation. After this was explained
to the defendant, counsel advised him to plead guilty to the first count.
186 Counsel did admit to having given his opinion as to the probable
outcome of the case, but did not tell the defendant that the "case[was] cut and dried." 182 Neb. 701, 704, 157 N.W.2d 165, 166 (1968).
When defendant was sentenced to eighteen months the instant pro-
ceeding was instituted.
'37 State v. Putnam, 182 Neb. 185, 153 N.W.2d 456 (1968); State v. Moss,
182 Neb. 502, 155 N.W.2d 435 (1968). In Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d
75 (5th Cir. 1966), the court held that ineffective assistance of counsel
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cited, the court appears to have concluded that the promises
allegedly made in this case fell within this general rule.
Justice Carter's dissent approves of the rule expressed in the
majority opinion, but asserts that counsel's actions in the instant
case would not come within its scope. He points out that the
processes of an attorney should not be scrutinized upon subsequent
review as a matter of hindsight, but rather the attorney's actions
should be judged from the perspective of the "facts and circum-
stances facing him at the time of the decision .... ",38
The majority fails to delineate any guidelines concerning what
an attorney may or may not say or do. Certainly the decision seems
to severely limit the utility of the plea bargain device since the court
strongly implies that an attorney may neither render an opinion
to his client regarding the probable outcome of negotiations with
the prosecuting attorney nor attempt to persuade his client to
enter a plea of guilty, without subjecting himself to a possible
charge of ineffective counsel and possibly even disbarment.
The practice of plea bargaining has rarely been acknowl-
edged, let alone scrutinized, by the appellate courts, and as a result
few decisions have directly confronted the Tunender problem. The
Nebraska Supreme Court "recommends" that upon tender of a
guilty plea in the future, the trial court should inquire about any
discussions and any plea agreements between counsel. This benevo-
lent recommendation is made to assure the defendant of the inde-
pendence of the court from the office of the district attorney,139
and is clearly an affirmative step toward recognizing that plea
bargaining exists. This recognition is obviously the vital pre-
requisite to any attempt to control the use of this procedure. Such
a recommendation also precludes the defendant from later raising
the argument that he relied upon the representations of counsel to
his detriment.
results when the assistance does nothing more than make a mockery
of justice and make the proceedings a farce. Evidently this same test
is now to be applied in Nebraska.
138 State v. Tunender, 182 Neb. 701, 709, 157 N.W.2d 165, 169 (1968)
(dissenting opinion). Note, however, that the majority opinion focuses
entirely on the representations made by counsel to his client as a
result of the plea negotiations. Justice Carter emphasizes the specific
facts involving the particular actions of the attorney. It is apparent
that each views the ineffective assistance in an entirely different
manner. The majority is unconcerned with whether the actual investi-
gation made was thorough, and such an attack, although helpful,
was unnecessary in Tunender.
139 Id. at 704, 157 N.W.2d at 166-67.
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Although the concept of "bargaining" is encouraged in civil
litigation, compromise in the criminal system arguably is repugnant
to the basic ideals of justice. The argument is that any compromise
in the criminal area is immoral because the State does not possess
the right to compromise. Justice and liberty are not proper subjects
for bargaining and barter. From a pragmatic standpoint, however,
elimination of plea bargaining would impose a procedural strangle-
hold on the trial court. Guilty pleas are said to be necessary to
relieve the backlog on court dockets. By taking cognizance of the
practice, the Nebraska Supreme Court has taken an affirmative
step in attempting to compromise these conflicting policies by
regulating the use of this device in order to promote the efficient
administration of justice.
Nevertheless, the decision still leaves Nebraska attorneys in a
perilous position. To avoid any possible repercussions the attorney
should advise his client that in his professional opinion, the result
will be a particular sentence. It must be made absolutely clear,
however, that this "prediction" is merely an opinion, and is in no
way a guarantee or promise. In essence, the burden has been
shifted to the attorney to justify any advice which he may render
to his client.
C. JUVEN s
(1) In DeBacker v. Brainard, Clarence DeBacker was arrested for
passing a forged check and a petition was ified charging the seven-
teen year old offender with being a delinquent child.140 DeBacker
objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground, inter alia,
that he had been denied the right to trial by jury. The objection
was overruled, petitioner was adjudicated a delinquent child, and
habeas corpus proceedings were instituted. Because of a provision
in the Nebraska Constitution which provides that a legislative act
may be held unconstitutional only on concurrence of five justices, 141
the adjudication of the juvenile court was affirmed in DeBacker v.
Brainard,142 although four justices believed the statute to be uncon-
stitutional. These four justices argued that a juvenile charged with
a violation of a state criminal law as the basis for an adjudication
of delinquency is entitled to a trial by jury in juvenile court if the
offense is one which would give rise to the right to a jury trial if
tried in a criminal court.
140 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968), prob. juris. noted, 393 U.S. 1076.
(1969).
141 "Delinquent child shall mean any child under the age of eighteen
years who has violated any law of the state or any city or village
ordinance;" NEB. REv. STT. § 43-201(4) (Reissue 1968).
142 NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2.
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The four justices seek to analyze the foundations upon which
In re Gault143 is based. Concededly Gault does not require that
juveniles be handled as adults, but it does require that due process
standards be observed in an adjudication based upon criminal mis-
conduct which could result in the placement of the juvenile in a
state institution. Since the right to a jury trial has been deemed
fundamental to due process under the fourteenth amendment in
Duncan v. Louisiana,'144 this right must be considered under Gault
as one of the procedural safeguards to be afforded juveniles.
The three justice "majority" is concerned primarily with whether
the rehabilitative objectives of a juvenile system may be less effec-
tive if burdened with such procedural "formalities" as trial by jury.
They fail to give attention to the more basic question of whether
fundamental fairness must be observed in any adjudication process
which could result in the juvenile's commission to an institution.
DeBacker also raises the issue of the proper burden of proof in
a juvenile case. Nebraska law provides that delinquency hearings
"shall be conducted by the judge... applying the customary rules
of evidence in use in civil trials without jury. .... 145 After the
evidence is introduced, the "court shall first consider only . . .
whether the minor is a [delinquent child] .' 46 The dissenting
justices in DeBacker argued that a finding of delinquency based
upon conduct which would be criminal if charged against an adult,
is valid only when the acts of delinquency are proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, and therefore the preponderance of the evidence
test espoused by the statute is unconstitutional. 147
(2) In Guy v. Doeschot148 the court was directly presented with
the issue of whether the burden of proof in a juvenile proceeding
should be the civil or criminal standard. However, the court de-
clined to answer and instead specifically held that the evidence
adduced was "insufficient to carry the burden of proof no matter
which standard is applied .... ,u49 Although the holding is clear,
Justice Carter asserts in his dissent that the majority opinion "relies
upon a rule ... of circumstantial evidence.., applicable only to the
jury" in a criminal case.150 Since this was not a "criminal" case and
143 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
144 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
'45 NB. REv. STAT. § 43-206.03 (2) (Reissue 1968).
146 NEs. Ray. STAT. § 43-206.03 (3) (Reissue 1968).
147 DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 471, 161 N.W.2d 508, 516 (1968)
(emphasis added).
148 183 Neb. 557, 162 N.W.2d 524 (1968).
149 Id. at 559, 162 N.W.2d at 526.
150 Id. at 561, 162 N.W.2d at 528 (dissenting opinion).
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there was no jury, the implication may be that the majority is
defining a higher standard of proof in a juvenile proceeding than
the preponderance of the evidence. Justice Carter believes without
question that there was sufficient evidence to justify the determina-
tion made by the trier of fact when measured by the preponderance
of the evidence standard. If the majority has adopted a rule
applicable only to a jury in a criminal case, then this same four
justice majority may have successfully accomplished an objective
which could not be realized in DeBacker v. Brainard.
The basis for the petition to adjudge the defendant a delinquent
child in Guy v. Doeschot was breaking and entering. A state's
witness testified that she heard the sound of breaking glass at
2:45 A.m. and observed two boys enter a grocery store across the
street from her home. After she had called the police, one of the
boys ran from the store, and the police apprehended the defendant
one-half block from the scene running at top speed.151 On these
facts the court holds the evidence insufficient to support an adjudica-
tion based upon conduct which would have been criminal if
charged against an adult. It is therefore arguable that the court
has, for all practical purposes, adopted a rule that goes to the weight
of circumstantial evidence applicable only in criminal trials. And
although the court does not directly require the lower courts to
observe this standard, both judges and attorneys must now recognize
that an appellate finding that "the evidence is insufficient to carry
the burden of proof, no matter which standard is applied in juvenile
court,' 15 2 is both relatively simple and distinctly possible.
V. DAMAGES
In Hughes Farms, Inc. v. Tri-State Generation and Transmission
Ass'n05 3 condemnation proceedings were instituted against Hughes
Farms to acquire a perpetual easement for the purpose of establish-
ing a power line on plaintiff-condemnee's land. The condemnee
appealed a damage determination by the county board appraiser,
and a jury trial resulted in an award of $12,538.40.15 4 The easement
151 This occurred only moments after the officers had received the call
Upon inquiry the defendant responded that he was merely "out for
a walk." The court held that his unexplained presence in the vicinity
was insufficient to satisfy either standard of proof for the adjudication.
152 Guy v. Doeschot, 183 Neb. 557, 559, 162 N.W.2d 524, 526 (1968).
153 182 Neb. 791, 157 N.W.2d 384 (1968).
154 The appraiser had given a judgment for $9,500. There was a great
deal of conflict as to the estimated damages, and plaintiff-condemnee
asserted his damages to approximately $45,000, while the condemnor
placed the damages between $2,500 and $3,000.
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was partially over land upon which the condemnee had planted
corn, but as a result of the construction of the power line, the land
could not be irrigated at a critical time. Consequently, there was a
loss of crops on land adjacent to the land which was condemned, as
well as to the crops growing on the easement.
The court in Wahlgren v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist.155 used
language indicating that damages were to be computed on the basis
of harm done to the land actually appropriated for use by the
condemnor. Based on this holding the condemnor association argued
that the measure of damages in a proceeding to acquire an ease-
ment for the purposes of establishing a power line was the diminu-
tion in value of the land upon which there was a restriction of the
use. This test would obviously exclude consideration of crop
damages on the adjacent land. However, Wahlgren had also stated
that damages were recoverable for injury to the land actually taken,
and for such injury to the residue of the land as is equivalent to
the diminution in the value thereof. 15 6
Clearly, the court was correct in dismissing the condemnor
association's reading of Wahlgren without extended discussion.
The reason that Wahigren allowed no more damages for injury
than the land actually taken was simply because there was no evi-
dence upon which a conclusion could have been based with respect
to additional damages. In the instant case, however, the condemnee
had gone to great lengths in attempting to establish the harm to
crops on the adjacent land resulting from construction of the
power line.
The Hughes Farms jury was instructed not to consider future
injury to the land in determining the property damages to be
awarded to the condemnee. To this instruction the defendant
objected, contending that the landowner is required to recover all
of his damages, including future crop damages, at the time of the
condemnation. However, in the condemnation application the
condemnor had proposed to obligate itself to reimburse the con-
demnee for all future crop damages incident to the construction of
the power line and had reserved to the landowners or lessees the
right to use the land under the line. That proposal, the condemnor
argued, was not a binding agreement under the authority of Little v.
Loup River Pub. Power Dist.157 Hence, all of the damages must be
computed at the initial condemnation proceeding. The general rule
is that mere unaccepted promissory statements which are only
155 139 Neb. 489, 297 N.W. 833 (1941).
156 Id. at 496, 297 N.W. at 838.
157 150 Neb. 864, 36 N.W.2d 261 (1949).
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declarations of future intentions by a condemnor cannot affect the
rights acquired by the condenmee or the amount of damages which
must be paid.158 The issue, therefore, was whether the application
proposal was merely promissory or was in fact contractual.
Obviously, in order to have a binding contractual obligation, the
condemnee must have accepted the proposal made by the con-
demnor. In Little, the court did not allow any statement to be made
to the jury concerning future damages because there was no
evidence that the proposal had been accepted by the condemnee.
In the instant case, however, the condemnee accepted the proposal
at the beginning of the trial, and made that acceptance part of the
record.159
Of major importance is that such a reservation with respect to
future damages must be agreed to by both parties. The question of
what constitutes an acceptance will generally arise prior to trial.
But in the absence of an agreement, reasoning from the factual
situation in Hughes, acceptance of the condemnor's proposal will be
sufficient if it is stated for the record, out of the presence of the jury,
that the condemnee accepts the offer with respect to the con-
demnor's promise to pay future damages to crops if they arise.
In an attempt to preserve this right the court recommended that
any judgment should contain a provision subjecting the acquired
easement to the obligation of the condemnor to pay such future
damages, if and when they occur. Such preservation would provide
the condemnee with an undisputable claim. It is unfortunate, how-
ever, that the condemnee did not object to the form of the judgment
in the instant case, which failed to make such a provision. As a
result, the condemnee may have to resort to a second lawsuit in any
attempt to recover future damages if they do occur. This will no
doubt raise practical problems of res judicata with respect to
whether the condemnee may recover in any subsequent suit insti-
tuted in his behalf. 60
'58 Id. See also Pierce v. Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation Dist.
143 Neb. 898, 11 N.W.2d 813 (1943). For an extensive collection of
cases in this area see Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 364 (1949).159 This is seemingly the best method to assure the binding acceptance
of such a proposal. In the instant case the acceptance was made out
of the jury's presence. If there had been a failure to accept prior to
trial, then that failure could be remedied at the time the trial
commences.
160 On the other hand, the question would be whether the condemnee
in this case would be able to carry over the judgment without the
necessity of going into a second trial. In this case the condemnee
would assert that the condemnor is collaterally estopped from assert-
ing that there is no binding contract.
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VI. EVIDENCE
Metropolitan Protection Serv. v. Tanner.161 Under the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act,16 2 a business record prepared
from prior records was held not admissible where it was prepared
a number of months after the recorded events took place and only
twelve days before trial. The circumstances within which the record
was made, including the "complexity of the information in the
record, training and skill of the recorder, and reasonableness of the
elapsed time generally"' 63 will be considered in deciding whether
a record is admissible under this uniform act.
In Metropolitan Protection Serv. v. Tanner" suit was brought
on the promise of defendant to pay for the services of the investi-
gating agency. The plaintiff investigating agency introduced ad-
mitted reports of part-time investigators which disclosed their
observations as well as hours worked and expenses. The disputed
record was a compilation of these reports which had been made by
the wife of the president of the agency at the conclusion of the
investigation.
The decision that this record was outside the exception to the
hearsay rule made by the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act
was based upon the fact that the entries were not made contem-
poraneously with the events. Thus, it lacked the probability of
trustworthiness which is thought to be inherent in contemporaneous
recording and is the basis for this exception to the hearsay rule.1'
161 182 Neb. 507, 155 N.W.2d 803 (1968).
162 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-12,108 to -12,110 (Reissue 1964). Section
25-12,109 reads: "A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar
as relevant be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified
witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and
if it was made in the regular course of business at or near the time
of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the court the
sources of information, method, and time of preparation were such
to justify its admission."
163 Metropolitan Protection Serv. v. Tanner, 182 Neb. 509, 512, 155 N.W.2d
803, 805 (1968).
164 Id.
165 The court cited 5 J. WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE, § 1526 (3d ed. 1940) which
states: "The entry should have been made at or near the time
recorded, not merely because this is necessary to assure a fairly
accurate recollection of the matter, but because any trustworthy habit
of making business records will ordinarily involve the making of the
record contemporaneously. The rule provides no precise time; each
case must depend upon its own circumstances." (Italics were quoted
by the court in Metropolitan, supra.) See also C. McComvcK, Evi-
DENCE § 284 (1954).
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Though this decision restricts the use of summary compilations
under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, other cases
have provided a method for properly admitting compilations or
tabulations of records into evidence at the discretion of the trial
judge.166 Such a summary was allowed in Durand, Jackson & Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Nasr,'1 an action for recovery of architectural services.
In the Metropolitan decision the court specifically limited itself
to the arguments made by counsel based upon the Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Act. The harsh consequences of this decision
may be avoided under the discretion allowed the trial court by
referring to Nasr and offering the compilations as audits or tabula-
tions rather than business records.
VII. INITIATIVE PETITION PROCEDURE
In State ex rel. Morris v. Marsh16 the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska clarified what is and is not procedurally acceptable in the
evaluation of an initiative petition under the Nebraska Constitu-
tion 69 and relevant statutes. 70
On July 3, 1968, petitions bearing the signatures of 57,521 electors
were filed with the secretary of state. On July 5, 1968, additional
petition forms were filed. The number of valid signatures needed
was 48,640. On July 3, 1968, a verified statement as to persons or
corporations contributing or receiving money or other things of
value was filed with the petition forms. Supplemental itemized veri-
fied statements were filed on August 12 and August 28, 1968. On July
26, 1968, the secretary of state issued his certification that fewer than
48,640 of the signatures had been found acceptable or valid, and
that the person or persons presenting such petitions had failed to
file a satisfactory itemized verified statement of contributions and
disbursements as required by statute. He then concluded that the
initiative petition was insufficient and refused to certify the pro-
posed amendment for placement on the ballot.
166 Rose v. Kahler, 151 Neb. 532, 535, 38 N.W.2d 391, 394 (1949): "The
applicable rule is that audits or statements of account prepared for use
at trial are not ordinarily admissible, but the trial court may, at its
discretion, admit them when they are merely abstracts, tabulations,
or summaries of other evidence capable of calculation which has
been properly admitted."
167 180 Neb. 409, 143 N.W.2d 122 (1966).
168 183 Neb. 502, 162 N.W.2d 262 (1968).
169 NEB. CoNsT. art. HI, § 2, which provides in part: "The first power
reserved by the people is the initiative whereby laws may be enacted
and constitutional amendments adopted by the people independently
of the Legislature...."
170 Nm. REv. STAT. § 32-704 (Reissue 1968).
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The Nebraska Supreme Court held in Marsh that the Nebraska
statute171 requiring a verified statement of every person, corporation
or association sponsoring the petition, or contributing or pledging
contributions of money need not be complete upon fling of the
initiative petition.172 Instead, they ruled that it would be adequate
if the itemized verified statement were filed in sufficient time to be
available to the public "well prior to the general election date."
This decision is particularly reasonable because it is usually not
possible to have a complete list of financial backers at the time
of filing an initiative petition. If such were the requirement, any
time the complete list of contributors was not available at the time
of the filing, the constitutional provision authorizing initiative peti-
tions would be effectively thwarted. A statute should be used only
to supplement the constitutional provision authorizing initiative
petitions and not to limit or render useless its intended purpose of
allowing the people themselves to participate in the legislative
process. 73
The Nebraska court held that initiative petitions are presumed
to be valid so long as they appear to have sufficient signatures
and are in proper form. The presumption of validity is to continue
until satisfactory proof is presented to rebut it. It is not rebutted
by merely showing clerical errors. The policy of placing the burden
on the state to prove the invalidity of a petition results from an
uncomplicated rationale-since the right to initiative petitions is a
constitutional right, it must be protected against overly technical
objections.174 The following are examples of technical and clerical
mistakes which the supreme court in Marsh held would not in-
validate the signatures:
-Where either the circulator of an initiative page or a signatory
sign as "Mrs." followed by the name of her husband, such
signatures are valid;
-Where the venue of a verification shows an erroneous county
and the remainder of the verification shows the actual county
of notarization, such does not invalidate;
-Where there are incomplete signatures or dates on initiative
petitions, they do not invalidate the remaining signatures;
171 Id.
172 See State ex rel. Winter v. Swanson, 138 Neb. 597, 294 N.W. 200 (1940);
Klosterman v. Marsh, 180 Neb. 506, 143 N.W.2d 744 (1966).
173 See State ex rel. Winter v. Swanson, 138 Neb. 597, 294 N.W. 200
(1940).
174 State ex rel. Ayres v. Amsberry, 104 Neb. 273, 177 N.W. 179 (1920).
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-Where signatures utilize only initials and the last name, such
signatures are valid;
-Where initiative petitions contain a sufficient address to iden-
tify the signers, they will be valid; and
-Where information is shown by ditto marks, it is valid.
It is quite apparent from Marsh that Nebraska courts will pro-
tect the right of initiative from any unnecessary obstructions. In
essence, all that will be required in order to have a valid petition
is a substantial compliance with the statutes.
VIII. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Lock v. City of Imperial1h7
An airport authority formed under the authorization of the
laws of the State of Nebraska1 76 is an independent public corpo-
ration, and the city which created such airport authority will
not be held for damages caused by the negligence of the corpora-
tion.17 7 In reaching this decision in Lock v. City of Imperia 178
the Nebraska Supreme Court, without comment, assumed that the
duties involved in the operation of an airport for the benefit of a
municipality were delegable to the independent corporation. Thus,
they focused only upon the question of whether the airport authority
was an agent of the city.
This issue arose in a suit against the City of Imperial and the
airport manager for negligent failure to properly maintain an
airport runway. The airport had been managed by the Airport
Authority of the City of Imperial since 1960 when the city had
created the public corporation.17 9 The airport authority had, since
that date, maintained exclusive jurisdiction and authority over the
operation and maintenance of the airport.180
175 182 Neb. 526, 155 N.W.2d 924 (1968).
176 Cities Airport Authorities Act, NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 3-501 to -514
(Reissue 1962).
177 Operation of an airport is a proprietary function of a city, and a
city is therefore liable for negligent acts in operating and maintain-
ing such. Braiser v. Cribbett, 166 Neb. 145, 88 N.W.2d 235 (1958).
178 182-Neb. 526, 155 N.W.2d 924 (1968).
179 NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 3-591 to -514 (Reissue 1962)
180 Appellee's brief at 10, Lock v. City of Imperial, 182 Neb. 526, 155
N.W.2d 924 (1968), quotes an affidavit from the chairman of the Air-
port Authority of the City of Imperial as follows: "That from April
11, 1960, to date, the City of Imperial, Nebraska, neither has had or
maintained jurisdiction or authority over the airport nor the opera-
tion or maintenance of same.... "
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When a city undertakes to act for the benefit of the municipality
in its corporate capacity, it must use ordinary care and diligence
to avoid injuries to others in the performance of such acts. 8 1
Furthermore, when a municipality undertakes such activities
it owes certain duties to the public which cannot be dele-
gated,18 2 and where a non-delegable public duty is found, no
agency relationship or respondeat superior theory need be shown
to impose liability upon the city. 83 Duty to the public in this
regard is limited to duties accruing to the general public such
as maintenance of the streets and sidewalks in a safe condition 84
or maintenance of the public water system.8 5
The duties arising from the operation of an airport are not gen-
eral public duties and are therefore delegable since such activity
is not traditionally carried on by the city for the safety and welfare
of the public. More important, the Nebraska Legislature has
specifically delegated the entire maintenance and operation of an
airport to the airport authority when such a corporation is formed
by the city. The powers and duties allowed under such authoriza-
tion are derived from the state rather than the city under which
the corporation is formed.8 0 Therefore, if the city is to be held for
the negligence of the airport authority, it must be by an agency
or respondeat superior relationship.
Whether a public corporation created under the laws of the
State of Nebraska is an agent of the governmental authority creating
such corporation must be determined, where possible, by the inten-
tion of the legislature. Statutes authorizing the airport authorities
provide that neither the city nor the state would be liable for the
debts of the authority; 187 and, more important, that the airport
authority shall "have and retain full and exclusive jurisdiction and
control over all facilities owned or thereafter acquired by such
city for the purpose of aviation operation, navigation and air safety
181 Updike v. City of Omaha, 87 Neb. 228, 127 N.W. 234 (1910). The
same is true where the legislature delegates the authority to so act
to the city. Henry v. City of Lincoln, 93 Neb. 331, 140 N.W. 664 (1913).
182 Harms v. City of Beatrice, 142 Neb. 219, 5 N.W.2d 287 (1942).
183 City of Beatrice v. Reid, 41 Neb. 214, 59 N.W. 770 (1894).
184 Id.
185 Harms v. City of Beatrice, 142 Neb. 219, 5 N.W.2d 287 (1942).
1s Murray v. City of Omaha, 66 Neb. 279, 92 N.W. 299 (1902) (City was
not held responsible for acts of independent board appointed under
the charter of the city as authorized by the laws of the State of
Nebraska).
187 NEB. Ray. STAT. § 3-509 (Reissue 1962).
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operation."'8 The airport authority is specifically given the power
to sue and be sued.189
The only powers retained by the city over the airport authority
is to fill vacancies190 on the authority board and remove members
thereof for "incompetence, neglect of duty, or malfeasance of
office."'91
Such limited perogatives cannot be considered sufficient super-
visory authority by the city as to subject the public corporation to
the control of the city.192 The airport authority is therefore, a
separate corporate entity for whose acts the city cannot be held
liable.
IX. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld in Tom and Jerry, Inc.
v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n 9 3 the validity of a Nebraska
statute which in effect requires beer retailers to purchase for cash
while permitting retailers of other alcoholic beverages to purchase
on credit.'"
The issue decided in Tom and Jerry was not whether the legis-
lature had the power to pass a statute regulating credit sales in the
liquor retail business, but whether the legislature had the authority
to separate retailers of alcoholic beverages into two distinct classes
and impose different restrictions upon each class. The plaintiffs
contended that the statute was unconstitutional because it was an
arbitrary classification not based upon any substantial difference
in situation or circumstance which would naturally suggest the
justice or expediency for the application of differing legislative
standards to the classes thus established. 1
The general rule regarding classification for legislative purposes
has often been repeated by the Nebraska Supreme Court:
188 NEB. REv. STAT. § 3-502 (Reissue 1962).
189 NEB. REV. STAT. § 3-504 (Reissue 1962).
190 NEB. REV. STAT. § 3-502 (Reissue 1962).
191 Id.192 In Brasier v. Cribbett, 166 Neb. 145, 88 N.W.2d 235 (1958), a city
was held liable for the negligence of the operator of the airport
since, under the contract between the operator and the city, the
city retained supervisory authority and the manager was subject to
the control and consent of the city in acting. The manager did not
have exclusive right to possession or regulation of the airport.
'93 183 Neb. 410, 160 N.W.2d 232 (1968).
194 NEB. REv. STAT. § 53-168 (Reissue 1968).
195 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 179 Neb.
817, 140 N.W.2d 668 (1966).
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The rule established by the authorities is that while it is compe-
tent for the legislature to classify, the classification, to be valid,
must rest on some reason of public policy, some substantial differ-
ence of situation or circumstances, that would naturally suggest
the justice or expediency of diverse legislation with respect to
objects classified.196
In United Community Serv. v. Omaha Nat'l Bank 97 the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that the legislature may legislate in regard
to a class of persons; but, it may not take what "may be termed a
natural class of persons, split that class in two, and then arbitrarily
designate the dissevered factions of the original unit as two classes
and enact different rules for the governing of each."' 98
In the area of alcoholic beverages, the long-standing policy has
been that the legislature may regulate more broadly and without
the same constitutional limitations confronting it as in the regula-
tion of other areas of public interest.19 9 The United States Supreme
Court held in Ziffrin v. Reeves °" that state legislatures may, without
at all infringing upon the due process clause, either terminate or
severely regulate all liquor sales within their states. Under the
states' inherent police power, the legislatures have the right to
prohibit, regulate, or restrict the use, manufacture, distribution
and sales of all alcoholic liquors, and to define alcoholic liquors of
their character as property.20 1 A Nebraska statute20 2 provides that
a liquor license shall not constitute property and the Nebraska
Supreme Court in Leeman v. Vorcella20 3 held that a liquor license
was not a property right.
In Arrigo v. City of Lincoln 0 4 the court stated that classification
must rest upon substantial differences in situations and circum-
stances separating the members of a natural class. In Tom and
Jerry the court held that there were real differences between the
196 State ex rel. Dawson County v. Farmers & Merchants Irrigation Co.,
59 Neb. 1, 3-4, 80 N.W. 52, 53 (1899). See also Safeway Stores, Inc.
v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 179 Neb. 817, 140 N.W.2d 668(1966); Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 177 Neb. 515, 129 N.W.2d 475
(1964).
197 162 Neb. 786, 77 N.W.2d 576 (1958).
198 Id.
'99 See Marsh & Marsh v. Carmichael, 136 Neb. 797, 287 N.W. 616 (1939);
Miller v. Zoning Comm'n, 135 Conn. 405, 65 A.2d 577 (1949); Safe-
way Stores, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 179 Neb. 817,
140 N.W.2d 668 (1966).
200 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939).
201 Id. See also In re Phillips, 82 Neb. 45, 116 N.W. 950 (1903).
202 NEB. REv. STAT. § 53-149 (Reissue 1968).
203 149 Neb. 702, 32 N.W.2d 274 (1948).
204 154 Neb. 537, 48 N.W.2d 643 (1951).
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situations and the circumstances of beer retailers and liquor re-
tailers. Therefore, the restriction placed on the beer retailers alone
was not arbitrary or unreasonable.
The important factor to be observed in the Torm and Jerry
decision is what constitutes real differences in situations and
circumstances for the determination of whether more than a single
class can be created. In the instant case, the court noted the follow-
ing distinctions: (1) liquors other than beer can be stocked by a
retailer in larger quantities than can beer; (2) liquor stock turnover
is not as rapid as the beer turnover; and (3) liquor warehouses are
usually more distant and deliveries less frequent than beer. The
court also noted the fact that the retail sale of beer and the retail
sale of other forms of alcoholic beverages were distinct. Precisely
what the difference was the court did not bother to make clear.
These real differences hardly seem "substantial" in the normal
sense of the word. But in reference to a legislative act which can
only be declared unconstitutional by a showing that it is arbitrary,
the word "substantial" seems to have a different meaning. That is:
if there are reasonable differences or likenesses then those differ-
ences or likenesses may be considered substantial. The presumption
is, therefore, that a legislative act, as the one in question in Tom
and Jerry, is constitutional unless it can be affirmatively shown
that there are no substantial differences between the class which
has restrictions imposed upon it and the class which is free of
restrictions. If this burden cannot be met, no basis exists for a
charge of legislative arbitrariness which would result in a declara-
tion that the statute is unconstitutional. 20 5
The Nebraska Supreme Court in upholding in Tom and Jerry
the validity of the statute classifying beer retailers and liquor
retailers other than beer into two distinct classes is in accord with
almost all other jurisdictions. 20
B. State ex rel. Norton v. Janing207 was a case of first impression
in the Nebraska Supreme Court. Norton, a contractor, was charged
with violation of a Nebraska penal statute208 for his failure to apply
205 State v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 147 Neb. 970, 25 N.W.2d 824 (1947).
208 See Weisberg v. Taylor, 409 Ill. 384, 100 N.E.2d 748 (1951); Sullivan
Inc. v. Cann's Cabins, 309 Mass. 519, 36 N.E.2d 371 (1941). See also
Annot., 136 A.L.R. 1238 (1942), for a discussion of the state's power
to control liquor.
207 182 Neb. 539, 156 N.W.2d 9 (1968).
208 NEB. Ray. SmT. § 52-119 (Reissue 1968): "It shall be unlawful for
any person, firn or corporation who has taken a contract for the
erection, improvement, repair or removal of any house, mill, manu-
factory or building of any kind for another, and has received pay-
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money received from a contract with Kusek (for the erection of a
garage), toward payment of a lien which had been filed against him
by Larson Cement Stone Company and McCan Concrete.
Norton was bound over to the district court for trial and while be-
ing held by the sheriff for want of bail, commenced a habeas corpus
proceeding asserting the unconstitutionality of the statute. Bas-
ically, he claimed that his detention in jail violated the state con-
stitutional provision that "[n]o person shall be imprisoned for debt
in any civil action on mesne of final 'process, unless in cases of
fraud."
The court held the statute authorizing imprisonment for the
failure to pay debts to be unconstitutional because it permitted
prosecution and possible imprisonment for failure to discharge
contractual obligations without any proof of fraud. The state had
contended that failure to prove fraud under the lien statute made
no difference because the statute itself was a criminal statute and
the constitutional provision prohibiting imprisonment for debt only
applies to civil actions. This contention was not accepted by the
court.
The decision examined and accepted the reasoning of People
v. Holder.210 In that case the California District Court of Appeals
had to deal with a similar statute and a constitutional provision
which prohibited "imprisonment for debt in any civil action . . .
unless in case of fraud. 211 The California court determined that the
prohibition against imprisonment for a debt cannot be evaded by
simply making a legislative determination that nonpayment of a
debt is a crime. The Nebraska court in accepting the California
reasoning, stated that legislative bodies have often validly made
ment in whole or in part upon such contract, to fail to apply the
money so received, or so much thereof as may be necessary for that
purpose, in payment of the lawful claims of such laborers' or mater-
rialmen's lien against said house or other structure unless such per-
son, firm or corporation, taking such contract, shall have received
and delivered to the owner of the property the written waiver of
lien from all persons who otherwise would have a right to file a
lien thereon."
209 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 20 (emphasis added).
210 53 Cal. App. 45, 199 P. 832 (1921).
211 Id. at 50, 199 P. at 835.
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acts criminal which were once innocent. However, the legislative
authority "to make acts criminal and punishable by imprisonment
cannot be extended to an invasion of the rights guaranteed the
citizens by the Constitution.... The exercise of them cannot be
a crime"12' Although the California constitution only makes im-
prisonment for a debt in civil actions unconstitutional, and the
statute in question in Norton concerned a criminal action, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court dismissed this distinction as being merely a
technical rather than a substantive distinction. The court reasoned
that form alone cannot change the actual substance of an enactment.
In striking down a statute which permitted prosecution for a crimi-
nal offense for the failure to pay a contractual obligation without
proof of fraud, our court has acted in accordance with the vast
majority of jurisdictions.2 1
By declaring the debt statute unconstitutional, the Nebraska
Supreme Court has also indicated that other statutes and court
decrees might be subject to a similar fate. In Cain v. Miller,214 the
court held that imprisonment for failing to pay alimony was not
violative of the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt.
In deciding Cain, the court confronted the same constitutional
provision that "no person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil
action on mesne or final process,215 unless in case of fraud" and
ruled:
A judgment, order or decree for payment of temporary alimony
possesses different characteristics from an ordinary debt. Before
it is made the court has decided that it is the duty of the defendant
in the case to support his wife, and that he has the power to do
so. It is designed to secure the performance of a legal duty in which
the public has an interest ... We conclude, therefore, that the order
to relator to pay temporary alimony is not a mere debt, and that
the provision of the Constitution... does not apply.X6
212 State ex rel. Norton v. Janing, 182 Neb. 539, 542, 156 N.W.2d 9, 11
(1968).
213 See Commercial Nat'l Bank of Sturgis v. Smith, 60 S.D. 376, 244 N.W.
521 (1932). Contra, State v. Williams, 133 Wash. 1212, 233 P. 285
(1925); Pauly v. Keebler 175 Wis. 428, 185 N.W. 554 (1921). These
two courts held that a state had the police power to imprison for
unpaid debts.
214 109 Neb. 441, 191 N.W. 704 (1922). See also Jensen v. Jensen, 119 Neb.
469, 229 N.W. 770 (1930); Fussell v. State, 102 Neb. 117, 166 N.W.
197 (1918).
215 NEB. CoNST. art. I, § 20.
216 Cain v. Miller, 109 Neb. 441, 447-48,191 N.W, 704, 707 (1922).
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The Cain2 1  decision directly overruled two previous Nebraska
cases 218 which held that imprisonment for failure to pay alimony
debt was unconstitutional. Is this to be distinguished from the
Norton case where the legislature has by statute declared that a
contractor must pay his debts? Just as the materialman's claim is
a lien on a contractor for an obligation owed by that contractor to
the materialman arising out of their contract, so alimony represents
a lien on a spouse for an obligation owed to the other spouse arising
from their marriage contract. If the analogy has validity, then the
Norton case indicates a new position by the court. On the other
hand, the Cain decision might be distinguished on the basis that in
that case, unlike Norton, imprisonment did not occur until after an
impartial judicial determination of the relevant facts, the entry of a
judgment, and the violation of that judgment.
The Cain court expressly noted that before a decree for alimony
is made, the lower court had decided that a duty of support existed
and, therefore, it had the authority to enforce that decision and the
decree requiring alimony payment through contempt proceedings.
The policy argument in support of giving a court the power to
enforce its decisions requiring payment of civil debts through con-
tempt proceedings and jail sentences is that without such authority
the court would have but very ineffective means to enforce its
decrees. It must be remembered, however, that neither the court
nor the legislature can controvert the express terms of the state
constitution and in the area of civil debts, the state constitution is
emphatic that imprisonment will not be tolerated.219
X. TORT-GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
In Brown v. City of Omaha220 the Nebraska Supreme Court held
that cities and all other governmental subdivisions and local bodies
of the state are not immune from tort liability arising out of the
ownership, use, and operation of motor vehicles.
217 The Nebraska Supreme Court has reaffirmed the Cain decision on
many occasions. See Jensen v. Jensen, 119 Neb. 470, 229 N.W. 770
(1930); Umphenocer v. Hoosen, 121 Neb. 870, 236 N.W. 762 (1931);
Maryott v. State, 124 Neb. 274, 246 N.W. 343 (1933); Thomas v.
Thomas, 132 Neb. 827, 273 N.W. 483 (1937).
218 Segear v. Segear, 23 Neb. 306, 36 N.W. 536 (1888); Leeder v. State, 55
Neb. 133, 75 N.W. 541 (1898).
219 Coughlin v. Ehlert, 39 Mo. 285 (1866); Marsh v. Marsh, 162 Ind.
210, 70 N.E. 154 (1904).
220 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968).
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The Brown decision has significantly changed the Nebraska law
in the area of sovereign immunity.221 Justice McCown 22 reasoned
that the entire concept of governmental immunity from tort liability
was antiquated and not relevant to modern society. Historically,
the immunity rule had rested upon three grounds: (1) that the
sovereign was inherently immune from suit; (2) that it is more
expedient for injured individuals to suffer than for the public in
general to be inconvenienced; and, (3) that governmental agents
will perform their duties more effectively if not hampered by fear
of tort liability.
In previous cases the Nebraska Supreme Court had drawn a
distinction between proprietary functions and governmental func-
tions22 in determining whether the governmental entity would be
held liable. However, in Brown, McCown dismissed the govern-
mental-proprietary test saying that it defied logical explanation.22
Scope Of The Decision
The three justices speaking through Justice McCown limit the
immediate impact of their decision by stating that in the entire
area of sovereign immunity there should be a "gradual judicial
transition which could be preferably accomplished by process of
221 Compare Greenwood v. City of Lincoln, 156 Neb. 142, 55 N.W.2d
343 (1952); Levin v. City of Omaha, 102 Neb. 328, 167 N.W.2d 214
(1918); Landmasser v. County of Cheyenne, 182 Neb. 345, 154 N.W.2d
706 (1968).
222 In Brown the court was split three ways: (1) McCown's opinion-
three justices favored abolishing tort immunity; (2) Boslaugh's con-
curring opinion-joined the three favoring abolishment because he
did not like the alternative as well; and (3) the dissenting opinion-
three justices opposed the judicial abolishment of tort immunity for
motor vehicles.
223 See Obitz v. Airport Authority of City of Red Cloud, 181 Neb. 410,
149 N.W.2d 150 (1967). Here the court said the powers granted to
municipal corporations can be divided into general classes and one
class, which includes powers which are legislative, public, and gov-
ernmental, and which import sovereignty; and a second class, which
includes powers which are corporate, proprietary, quasi-private, and
which are conferred for private advantage of municipal corporations.
See also Lock v. City of Imperial, 182 Neb. 526, 155 N.W.2d 924 (1968).
Operation of an airport is a proprietary function and subjects the city
to tort liability if the city itself is operating it.
224 "The citizen who has been negligently injured by a vehicle of the
city water department (which is a proprietary function) may recover,
but the citizen who has been negligently injured by a vehicle of the
city health department (which is a governmental function) of the
same city cannot recover." Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 431,
160 N.W.2d 805, 806 (1968).
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inclusion and exclusion, case by case, and stop by stop. '22 Un-
fortunately, this statement is wholly incompatible with the court's
fundamental premise that the basic doctrine is obsolete and unjust.
If the entire concept of governmental tort immunity is obsolete and
unjust, there is no logical support for a gradual transition through
inclusion and exclusion. If this gradual transition is to occur on a
case to case basis, then the possibility remains open that the evolu-
tion towards abolishing immunity from torts might be seriously
slowed or completely stopped in a future judicial decision.22 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Holytz v. City of Milwau-
kee,2 ' which was cited in Brown, adopted a far more cohesive
rationale for rejection of the immunity theory with their holding
that there would be no future governmental immunity in the
whole tort field.
In determining the tort liability of a municipality it is no longer
necessary to divide its operations into those which are proprietary
and those which are governmental. Our decision does not broaden
the government's obligation so as to make it responsible for all
harms to others; it is only as to those harms which are torts that
governmental bodies are to be liable by reason of this decision.228
It would also appear that Brown establishes no workable test
for determining when the doctrine of immunity will or will not be
applicable. Nevertheless, the court assumes the responsibility for
making this very determination with their decision to include and
exclude other areas of tortious conduct within the no-immunity rule
on a case by case basis. To state that the doctrine is obsolete and
unjust and then to specifically say that the court may or may not
apply it in other cases is to give no guidance at all
There appear to be two reasons for Justice McCown's caution:
(1) the desire to avoid performing a legislative function; and/or,
(2) the desire to begin dismantling the doctrine of immunity by
stating a general policy while still reserving for future considera-
tion a variety of uncertain problems in the area. His opinion
specifically notes that because governmental immunity from tort
liability encompasses such a large field, the legislative processes
and procedures would be more effective in determining a compre-
hensive solution. And, "the court's processes and procedures are
more effectively directed to a solution more narrowly limited to
specific facts framed in litigated cases."2
29
225 Id. at 435, 160 N.W.2d at 808.
226 See note 222 supra.
227 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
228 Id. at 39-40, 115 N.W.2d at 625.
229 Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 434, 160 N.W.2d 805, 808 (1968).
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Although the decision in Brown is definitely limited, the holding
expresses a clear intent to abolish governmental tort immunity
protection in Nebraska. Certainly this is consistent with the move-
ment to abolish the doctrine which is prevalent throughout the
country.2 30 The Brown decision can be cited for the general propo-
sition that immunity from tort liability is unjust, obsolete, and may
no longer be a successful defense, and for the specific proposition
that the doctrine of immunity no longer protects against tort
liability arising out of the use and operation of motor vehicles.
XI. TORTS
Brugh v. Peterson231 has altered the meaning of "gross negli-
gence" as used in Nebraska's motor vehicle guest statute.232 The
court held in effect that each act or omission of the defendant driver
must be by itself "grossly negligent." At approximately 10 p.m.,
an automobile driven by one Fischer was proceeding east on Pio-
neers Boulevard in Lincoln, Nebraska. After failing to stop at a
"Stop" sign, this auto entered the intersection of Seventieth Street,
at which point it was struck by the Peterson automobile which had
been proceeding south on Seventieth Street.
Fischer's negligence consisted of (1) failure to Aiotice and react
to the reflectorized "Pavement Ends" sign 1,000 feet west of the
intersection, (2) failure to notice and react to the reflectorized
"Stop Ahead" sign 400 feet from the intersection, (3) failure to hear
and/or react to a statement made by Campbell, a passenger, re-
garding the "Stop" sign, (4) failure to see the headlights of another
vehicle approaching the intersection at approximately the same
time, and (5) failure to see and/or react to the "Stop" sign itself.
At no time during the entire 1,000 feet traveled from the "Pavement
Ends" sign to the intersection did the defendant Fischer change or
reduce his speed or apply his brakes.
A wrongful death action was brought by the estate of Dennis
Brugh, a passenger in the Fischer automobile, against Fischer and
against the driver of the other automobile involved in the inter-
section collision. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of
$35,000.00 against each defendant. The defendant's motions for
judgments not withstanding the verdict were overruled but their
motions for a new trial were sustained. Plaintiff appealed this
determination.
230 See, e.g., Holytz v. City of Milwaukee. 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618
(1962); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 11 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
231 183 Neb. 190, 159 N.W.2d 321 (1968).
232 NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-740 (Reissue 1968).
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In order for a plaintiff to be successful in maintaining an action
for wrongful death under the Nebraska motor vehicle guest statute,
the plaintiff must prove gross negligence of the driver.233 Interpre-
tations of the statute define gross negligence to include great and
excessive negligence or negligence in a very high degree which
indicates the absence of even slight care in performance of a duty.234
There is no fixed rule for ascertaining what is gross negligence
within the meaning of the guest statute. Rather, the determination
has been made dependant upon the facts and circumstances of each
particular case.2  Prior to the Brugh decision, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court had usually chosen to define gross negligence in
negative terms. It is not momentary inattention,236 it does not
necessarily extend to wanton or wilful or intentional disregard for
a guest's safety, 37 it may not always arise from an act but may
arise from a series of acts or omissions.
23 8
Previous decisions of the Nebraska court had set certain broad
guidelines on how the facts and circumstances of each particular
case should be analyzed in order to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence for a finding of gross negligence. In Smith v.
Damato,2 39 the defendant's decedent drove his automobile into a
road grader head-on while moving at a high speed and after passing
signs reading "Road Repairs Ahead" and "Men Working" which
had red flags attached to them. The road grader was visible at all
times from a distance of one-quarter mile or more. The Nebraska
Supreme Court ruled that in these circumstances each act of the
defendant should not be segregated and weighed separately to
determine whether or not it alone constituted gross negligence
under the guest statute. Instead, the acts should be viewed as a
whole and as they relate to each other. In affirming the trial
court's finding that the defendant had been grossly negligent, the
Smith court applied the test which had been formulated in Komma
v. Kreil. °40 In Komma, the Nebraska Supreme Court had estab-
lished that in a death action under the guest statute where no single
act of the host could be separated from the whole, or from the
233 Id.
234 Callen v. Knopp, 180 Neb. 421, 143 N.W.2d 266 (1966); O'Neill v.
Henke, 167 Neb. 631, 94 N.W.2d 322 (1959); Rice v. Neisins, 160 Neb.
617, 71 N.W.2d 116 (1955).
235 In re Bradner's Estate, 173 Neb. 692, 114 N.W.2d 730 (1962).
236 Callen v. Knopp, 180 Neb. 421, 143 N.W.2d 266 (1961).
237 Hess v. Holdsworth, 176 Neb. 774, 127 N.W.2d 487 (1964).
238 Id.
239 172 Neb. 811, 112 N.W.2d 21 (1961). See also Carley v. Meinke, 181
Neb. 648, 150 N.W.2d 256 (1967).
240 144 Neb. 745, 14 N.W.2d 591 (1944).
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several acts of the host, as an independent cause of the fatal acci-
dent, the acts of the host were to be considered as a whole and
could not be weighed separately to determine whether any of them
constituted gross negligence.
It is apparent that no one act of the defendant can be separated
from the whole of these acts and held to be the independent cause
of this accident. Under these circumstances, each act is not to be
segregated and weighed separately to determine whether or not
it constituted gross negligence. The several acts are to be con-
sidered as a whole. While each of several acts, standing alone, may
not exceed the bounds of ordinary negligence, yet, taken together,
they may establish gross negligence. In such cases, it is for the jury
to determine whether a defendant is guilty of gross or ordinary
negligence. A verdict should not be directed nor a cause of action
dismissed unless a court can definitely determine that the evidence
of defendant's negligence, when taken as a whole, fails to reach the
degree of negligence that is considered gross. Here the jury were
not bound to find that defendant's acts were negligence in a very
high degree, but a jury question was in our opinion presented as to
whether or not, under the circumstances here, the things which
defendant did and failed to do amounted to negligence in a very
high degree, i.e., gross negligence.2 4'
The Supreme Court in both Smith and Komma thus held that the
question of gross negligence is for the jury unless it is definitely
apparent from the evidence that there was no possibility of gross
negligence. From the facts in Brugh, the defendant Fischer might
have been guilty of gross negligence, and, if the test laid down in
Komma and followed in Smith were applied to the facts in Brugh,
the question of gross negligence would have been a jury question
not to be interfered with by either the trial judge or the appellate
court except upon a finding that the jury's determination was not
based upon the evidence.
The Komma test for the determination of gross negligence seems
to be based on sound logic. Since gross negligence as opposed to
ordinary negligence is a question of degree, it is apparent that such
a question requires'a factual distinction and, therefore, is essentially
a jury question.
The Nebraska court has also held in Hess v. HoZdsworth242
that a finding of gross negligence was justified if there was
evidence of imminence of danger which was apparent to or known
by the operator and if he was timely cautioned by the guest con-
cerning the manner of operation, and if he still persisted in the
negligent operation consisting not only of speed but of other condi-
tions, known to the operator, which enhanced the peril. This rule
241 Id. at 750-51, 14 N.W.2d at 595.
242 176 Neb. 774, 127 N.W.2d 487 (1964).
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could be applicable to Brugh where a warning was given but was
not heeded; the Supreme Court did not, however, consider Hess in
the course of the Brugh opinion.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in deciding Brugh, deviated
considerably from its former decisions defining gross negligence.
The majority divided the total factual picture into segments. They
then analyzed each segment independently relying upon prior cases
to hold the separate incidents insufficient to constitute gross negli-
gence.243 The court said that the failure to stop at the "Stop" sign
or see the Peterson automobile, alone, was insufficient to establish
gross negligence.2 4 It stated that the failure to observe warning
signs was not gross negligence.2 45 The court reasoned that the
string of omissions (failure to observe the reflectorized "Pavement
Ends" sign, the "Stop Ahead" sign, the verbal warning, the lights
of the southbound automobile, and the reflectorized "Stop" sign)
were merely momentary in nature. It is submitted that if such a
series of omissions are merely momentary in nature and can be
considered as segments, independent of each other, then the prior
meaning of gross negligence, as used in the guest statute, has been
drastically changed. It would now appear that gross negligence
can only be established by proving one isolated act which is, by
itself, per se grossly negligent. The result of this decision is to make
gross negligence under the guest statute extremely difficult to prove.
What constitutes gross negligence in states which have adopted
a guest statute varies greatly.246 Some states still demand ordinary
care to be exercised by the host to his guests. Most states, how-
ever, define gross negligence in terms similar to Nebraska's ap-
proach prior to the Brugh decision. Nebraska now has joined the
minority of states in its interpretation of gross negligence under
the guest statute.
243 Brugh v. Peterson, 183 Neb. 190, 197, 159 N.W.2d 321, 326 (1968) (dis-
senting opinion).
244 See Callen v. Knopp, 180 Neb. 421, 143 N.W.2d 266 (1966). The mi-
nority opinion distinguishes this case from present by noting the
driver in Callen did not realize he was entering an intersection where
there was a "Stop" sign on the arterial and was looking in the
opposite direction from the approaching vehicle. Under such cir-
cumstances, his negligence was characterized as momentary in nature
rather than persisting over a period of time.
245 Boismier v. Maragues, 176 Neb. 547, 126 N.W.2d 844 (1964). In Bois-
mier the accident occurred at night, at a "T" intersection involving
no other vehicles. The signs involved had no illumination qualities;
the location of the only sign apparently not at the intersection itself
was not shown; the driver put on his brakes as soon as he recognized
the danger ahead.
246 See Annot., 3 A.L.R. 3d 180 §§ 42, 43, 44 for a summary of the various
approaches courts take to determine this question.
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XII.. TRAFFIC ADMINISTRATION
In Ziemba v. John.S2 7 defendant was arrested for operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.248
Under Nebraska law it is provided that:
Any person who operates ... a motor vehicle upon a public high-
way in [Nebraska] shall be deemed to have given his consent to
submit to a chemical test of his blood, urine, or breath, for the
purpose of determining the amount of alcoholic content in his bodyfluid. The test shall be administered.., whenever the person has
been arrested.24 9
Defendant refused to take the test and a hearing was held to de-
termine whether his refusal was reasonable.50
At the hearing defendant asserted that his refusal was reason-
able because he had entered a plea of guilty to the criminal charge
of drunken driving.5 1 The Director of Motor Vehicles deemed this
an unreasonable ground for refusal and defendant's license was
revoked for a period of one year. On removal to the district court,
defendant's license was reinstated and the Director appealed.
On appeal the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a plea of guilty
to a criminal charge of drunken driving does not preclude the sub-
sequent revocation of the defendant's license in an administrative
247 183 Neb. 644, 163 N.W.2d 780 (1968).
248 Nebraska law provides that: "It shall be unlawful for any person to
operate or be in actual physical control of any motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol...." NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-727 (Reissue
1968).
249 NE. Ry. STAT. § 39-727.03 (Reissue 1968) (emphasis added).
250 The procedure adopted was in conjunction with the following statu-
tory provision: "If a person so arrested shall refuse to submit to the
test.., it shall not be given, and the arresting officer shall make a
sworn statement to the Director of Motor Vehicles stating that he
had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating...
a motor vehicle.., under the influence of alcoholic liquor... and that
he refused to submit t6 the test." NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-727.08 (Reissue
1968). It is further provided that "[u]pon receipt of the officer's re-
port... the Director ... shall notify such person of a date for hear-
ing before him as to the reasonableness of the refusal to submit to
the test... [I]f it is not shown... that such refusal... was reason-
able, the Director shall summarily revoke the privilege of such
person, for a period of one year from the date of such order." NEB.
Ray. STAT. § 39-727.09 (Reissue 1968).
251 The criminal proceeding occurred prior to the administrative proceed-
ing before the Director, and resulted in a conviction, fine, and a
mandatory six month suspension of the defendant's driver's license.
1039
1040 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 48, NO. 4 (1969)
proceeding under the implied consent law.252 The holding rejected
defendant's contention that the only purpose behind the implied
consent law was to adduce evidence in order to obtain a criminal
conviction of the licensee. A second purpose, it was held, is to
protect the public from the irresponsible driver.23
While it is clear that defendant's argument, that refusal to sub-
mit to the test is subsequently made reasonable by a guilty plea to
a charge of drunken driving, is a form of "bootstrapping," it is just
as clear that the plea of guilty eliminates the necessity for the
chemical test required by law. The prescribed test is designed
solely to determine the alcoholic content of the blood, and if the
test results establish that a specific percentage of blood content is
alcohol, the defendant will be convicted of the statutory offense
and his license will be suspended as part of the mandatory sentence.
In this manner the statute serves to protect the public from the
irresponsible driver. It is not clear in such a situation, however,
precisely how an administrative hearing to determine the reason-
ableness of a refusal to submit to a chemical test is intended to
protect the public from the irresponsible driver. That hearing is
only for one purpose: to determine whether the defendant's refusal
to submit to the test was reasonable.254 Therefore, it is immaterial
whether the defendant actually was intoxicated. By holding, as
the majority in Ziemba does, that the hearing is designed to protect
the public by making a determination of reasonableness, the major-
ity is, in effect, holding that the public is being protected from the
driver who was unreasonable in his refusal to submit to the test.
The statute penalizes a failure to submit to the chemical test
even though the reason for the test has been eliminated.2 Clearly,
252 The court reasoned that the administrative proceeding was merely
to determine whether a person's privilege to drive shall be revoked.
Therefore, any criminal prosecution for drunken driving has no
bearing on this proceeding. See Marbut v. Motor Vehicles Depart-
ment of Highway Commissions, 194 Kan. 620, 400 P.2d 982 (1965);
Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d
75 (1981).
25 183 Neb. 644, 647, 163 N.W.2d 780, 782 (1968). A hearing to determine
the reasonableness of a refusal to submit to a chemical test is not
concerned with whether the chemical results which would have been
obtained would have served a legitimate purpose in a criminal pro-
ceeding. An unreasonable refusal may not be subsequently trans-
formed into a reasonable refusal simply because the person has been
convicted.
254 NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-727.09 (Reissue 1968).
255 The major reason for the statute is to adduce evidence in order to
obtain a plea of guilty. This conviction results in an automatic sus-
pension of the operator's license, and in this manner the public is
protected from the irresponsible driver.
NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
the administrative proceeding is separate and distinct from the
criminal proceeding.258 But by virtue of the statutory scheme, the
hearing effectuates public policy by revoking one's license upon
refusal to submit only where the defendant has not pleaded guilty.
That proceeding carries with it the mandatory suspension of the
defendant's operators license. This public policy would not neces-
sarily have been effectuated, however, had the defendant not
entered a plea of guilty.
Had the defendant submitted to the test and subsequently
pleaded guilty to the criminal charge of drunken driving, he would
have had his license revoked; in all likelihood, for a period of six
months. But since he refused to take the test, an additional sus-
pension of one year is imposed for no other reason than because he
was "unreasonable" in refusing to take the test. This has nothing
to do with protecting the public, unless it be argued that the
additional suspension is serving this function. But the result is
illogical, and perhaps the court has too readily dismissed the
rationale presented by the defendant.
XIII. WILLS--STATUTORY EXEMPTION
IN LIEU OF HOMESTEAD
The Nebraska Supreme Court held in In re Estate of Grassman257
that there was fraud in the inducement in the making of an ante-
nuptial agreement sufficient to render it voidable because there was
not full disclosure of all material facts relating to the amount and
value of the wife's estate prior to the signing the document.2 8 It
also held that the surviving husband was entitled to an award of
$500.00 in lieu of homestead when the wife as head of the household
died without a homestead.
Wade and Katherine were married in the early afternoon of
August 17, 1960, in Alliance, Nebraska. Immediately prior to the
wedding, Wade was asked by Katherine's attorney to sign the
following document:
256 Note, however, that this is subject to the provisions of NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 39-727.14 (Reissue 1968), which allows the Director to suspend a
license upon conviction of an offense of driving under the influence
of intoxicating liquor.
257 183 Neb. 147, 158 N.W.2d 673 (1968).
258 See In re Estate of Logan Enyart, 100 Neb. 337, 160 N.W. 120 (1916).
The court held that even if the intended spouse knows in a general
way that the intended husband is wealthy that is not enough to
satisfy the full disclosure requirement in making antenuptial con-
tracts.
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The undersigned, Wade W. Grassman, who is contemplating mar-
riage to Katherine Kent... hereby agrees and contracts that he
shall receive no part of the estate of said Katherine Kent should
he survive her. He hereby completely and without any reserva-
tion renounces and surrenders any and all rights he might acquire
in her property by reason of being her husband should she pre-
cede him in death.
The signing by Wade was done hurriedly. In fact, both reading and
signing the agreement required no more than three minutes. Kath-
erine's attorney made no explanation to Wade of the nature or
extent of Katherine's property and Wade knew nothing of the ex-
tensive property owned by his fiance. Katherine, prior to the
wedding, had executed a will leaving all of her property to her two
daughters from a previous marriage.
A year after the marriage, Wade became disabled and began
receiving $350.00 per month as disability pay plus $100.00 per month
from Katherine for his support. When Katherine died, Wade
brought an action for his statutory share 9 of Katherine's estate
and for a statutory exemption in lieu of homestead.260
In voiding the agreement, the court reasoned that antenuptial
agreements will apply equally to either spouse so long as full prior
disclosure of all the real and personal property is made. If the
full disclosure requirement is not met, then the agreement will be
subject to voidance.
The antenuptial agreement in Grassman could have also been
voided for its failure to comply with the statute.2 61 The document
was not signed by both the parties (Wade alone signed it) to the
proposed marriage nor was it acknowledged in the manner required
by law for the conveyance of real estate.2 62
The Nebraska Supreme Court, allowing Wade a $500.00 statutory
exemption in lieu of homestead, found that Katherine had been the
head of the household. The exemption statute provides in part:
All heads of families who have neither lands, town lots or houses
subject to exemptions as a homestead, under the laws of this state,
shall have exempt from forced sale on execution the sum of five
hundred dollars in personal property, except wages .... 263
259 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-103 (Reissue 1964).
260 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1152 (Reissue 1962).
261 NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-106 (Reissue 1964) provides in part: "'Such con-
tract shall be in writing signed by both parties to such marriages and
acknowledged in the manner required by law for the conveyance of
real estate...."
262 See Dorshorst v. Dorshorst, 174 Neb. 886, 120 N.W.2d 32 (1963) which
held that a valid antenuptial agreement can only exist if executed
in accordance with statutory requirements.
263 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1552 (Reissue 1962).
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Prior cases have held that support of a dependent husband ordinar-
ily qualifies the wife as head of the family within the meaning of the
exemption 28 4 However, the court inadequately answered the ques-
tion of precisely what criteria must be met for the wife to become
the head of the household when the husband is not a dependent. In
Grassman Wade was receiving $350.00 monthly in disability pay
which was supplemented by an additional $100.00 monthly from his
wife. Thus, only two-ninths of his support was coming from
Katherine. This varies little from the hypothetical where a hus-
band retires and receives $700.00 monthly in retirement benefits
and his wife supplements that with $200.00 monthly that she receives
in wages. Is she to be considered the head of the family? What if
the husband receives $350.00 monthly and the wife receives $100.00
monthly? From the holding in Grassman, the wife in these hypo-
theticals could be declared the head of the household for statutory
exemption purposes.
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that where a husband is
living and residing with his family, he is the householder and head
of the family as contemplated by the statute.2 In South Carolina a
husband, who had been separated from his wife for fourteen years,
and who during such time did not support his wife, was nevertheless
the head of the household, and therefore entitled to a homestead;
the separation not having absolved him from the duty to support
his wife 268
The best method for determining the question of statutory
exemption would be to define the purpose of the statute. It appears
that the purpose of the statute was to provide a sum sufficient
for a spouse to find housing upon the death of the other spouse.
If this is what the statute was meant to accomplish, then the court's
award to Wade of $500.00 in lieu of homestead was probably correct
in light of the fact that Katherine's house was willed to her two
daughters and thereby left Wade without a place to live. The
Nebraska Supreme Court in Grassman implied this rationale but
did not specifically state it. It would appear that the court preferred
to become involved with the meaning of "head of the household"
rather than with the more obvious inquiry into the purpose of the
statute.
Roger M. Beverage '70
Thomas R. Pansing, Jr. '69
John A. Rasmussen, Jr. '70
264 State ex rel Lucas v. Houch, 32 Neb. 525, 49 N.W. 462 (1891).
265 Taylor v. Taylor, 223 Ill. 423, 79 N.E. 139 (1906).
266 Appeal of Broakland Bank, 112 S.C. 400, 100 S.E. 156 (1919).
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